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ABSTRACT 
Currently, commanders must ensure that Soldiers are proficient in hundreds of 
Core and Directed Mission Essential Tasks prior to deployment.  However, Pre-
Deployment training is constrained by limitations on available resources.  As a 
result, commanders must decide whether to attempt to train everything to a 
limited level of proficiency, or to focus on certain tasks.   
Attempting to train everything is nearly impossible, as there is competition 
between units for finite training resources (land, ammo, etc.), and even if 
resources were infinite, there is not enough time.   Soldiers may become “jacks 
of all trades, masters of none,” and upon encountering some task later during 
deployment with which they are only somewhat familiar, a lack of complete 
proficiency can have critical effects.   
If instead a commander attempts to focus on a limited number of tasks 
and train those to levels of mastery, Soldiers will be very prepared to deal with 
situations involving those tasks, but when presented with situations not involving 
those tasks, unfamiliarity may produce catastrophic results.   
The result is that commanders often make decisions to prioritize training 
and allocate effort based upon higher guidance, intuition, or in the worst case, on 
what training is available.  Overall, the decisions are, at best, guesses as to what 
may occur later during deployment.  This research will attempt to identify what 
primarily influences decisions when training, and then propose a methodology for 
making more optimal decisions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The first 100 days will always be the hardest for survivability. The 
enemy is testing your unit, looking for strengths and weaknesses, 
and trying to scare you a little bit.1  
     -1st Lieutenant, Service Support Platoon  
      Leader, CALL OEF First 100 Days  
 
What if it were possible for a deploying unit to arrive in its new area 
of operations with the proper skill set and same proficiency in those 
skills as the unit that was departing after a 12-month tour? Would 
the “First Hundred Days” really last a hundred days? 
       - quote from thesis author 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to study whether it is possible to develop a 
better methodology for selecting tasks for pre-deployment training.  This research 
focuses on the training of general individual skills for mission essential tasks, 
regardless of military occupational specialty.  Although the context is the 
Afghanistan theater of operations, this discussion is not specifically about 
counterinsurgency (COIN).  Developing Soldiers and Leaders with the proper 
skills and mindset to conduct COIN-specific missions such as population 
engagement and host nation force partnering and mentoring is a whole other 
conceptual and philosophical discussion.  Before Soldiers can execute COIN, 
they need a solid foundation of basic individual skills.  Given the constrained 
contemporary operating environment, the author believes it is possible to use a 
more holistic approach to design training that will be more effective for deploying 
 
1 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The First 100 Days – Operation Enduring Freedom 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, ed. Combined Arms Center, 09-02 ed. (Ft. Leavenworth, 
KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2008), 23, http://call.army.mil (accessed 3 August 2009). 
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Soldiers.  There are myriad influences in the contemporary operating 
environment that affect leaders’ choices of what to train and what not to train, 
and this thesis examines those influences, their impacts, and proposes a 
potential solution.  Existing literature, and surveys of four infantry brigade combat 
teams provide an initial analysis of current task selection for predeployment 
training, and the author proposes a mathematical model to assist commanders 
and operations officers in efficiently and effectively allocating the most limiting of 
resources—time.        
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can units maximize the expected utility of Pre-Deployment Training 
(PDT) by taking into account the factors of Situational Awareness, Personal 
Preferences, and Available Resources?  In the scope of this research, there are 
three primary influences on the training unit’s conduct: a commander/planner’s 
knowledge of his area of operations, the commander’s personal bias towards 
conducting some types of training more than others, and the limiting cost in terms 
of time or training resources.  The intent of this research is to verify that these are 
the factors affecting training, and to propose a methodology to make more 
efficient and accurate decisions. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. Literature Review 
A review of the existing literature such as after action reviews (AARs), 
vignettes, and monographs indicated that in some cases, units had to conduct 
further training after arriving to their operational areas, but did not explain why 
these discrepancies between pre-deployment training and deployment occurred.  
Much of the literature described best practices for conducting missions and 
leaders’ lessons learned.  Some of the literature described pre-deployment 
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training experiences, as far as which training Leaders conducted, or some of the 
challenges faced during training.  However, there were scant references 
describing why Leaders conducted certain types of training, or why some tasks 
received more or less focus than others.  Overall, the body of literature described 
the start point of receiving a mission and training for it, and the end of how the 
mission culminated.  Yet, there was little, to no, discussion of the in-between: 
why Leaders decided to train specific skills.      
2. Training Surveys 
Due to the lack of information specifically addressing how leaders 
prioritized training, surveys of units will provide the most focused data to answer 
this question.  To prevent collected data from being dated or too narrow in focus, 
the survey population was Infantry, Field Artillery, Logistical, Engineer, and 
Military Police units deployed since 2006.  The echelons focused on were 
company and battalion.  Polling different types of units and members at different 
echelons in those units minimized personal biases and organizational prejudices 
in the responses.   
The survey subjects were: 
A.  Recently-deployed leaders and subordinates  
B. Unit Leaders and Operations Officers from units at the end of their 
training prior to deployment 
Subordinates from Category A completed a survey to determine the 
effectiveness of the unit training and also determine the delta of what should and 
should not have been conducted. Leaders from recently deployed units 
completed the same survey as those from Category B.   
Surveys from Category B will determine what methodology Leaders used 
to design training plans, and what the greatest influences on their choices were. 
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3. Optimization Program 
An optimization program will model and demonstrate the effects of the 
experimental hypotheses, and mathematically show similar trends indicated by 
the surveys.  Each task will be a decision variable in the objective function.  The 
goal of the objective function is to maximize the utility of a training plan.  Because 
there is no unit of profit to express in this model, utility as a function of choices 
will be the measure to evaluate the results of the model.  Each task will receive a 
value from one to five in accordance with the commander’s priority, and the tasks 
will also receive a value for the frequency with which a Soldier uses it.  These 
values will be the coefficients for each decision variable.  The constraining 
resource for the model is time, and the model will maximize the utility of the 
training plan by allocating time to each task.   
The optimization program will be useful as decision support tool for later 
use by Leaders when designing training.  Leaders will be able to select tasks to 
train, and input the same priorities, frequencies, and time based upon real-world 
conditions for their units’ deployment, and the model will return a statistically 
correct allocation of time for each training task. 
This research is important because if it proves correct, and the model is 
accurate, it could encourage a change in thinking that will encourage units to do 
better analysis and seek more relevant inputs when designing training.  Chance 
or luck (for either friendly or enemy forces) will be a constant in combat and 
beyond the control of either side.   We will never have perfect intelligence on 
where and when an IED strike may occur, or complete knowledge of the enemy’s 
capabilities and plans, or what the attitudes and opinions of civilians will be that 
will lead to subsequent events.  Attempting to control these events is impossible.  
However, we do have the ability to incorporate probability of events occurring into 
our estimates and planning.  Using known trends, patterns, and other available 
data, it is possible to make a learned prediction on the likelihood of events 
occurring.   
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Based upon these predictions incorporating probability, Leaders can 
design training now that will have a higher probability of being sufficient for later 
events.   Again, chance is beyond control, but Leaders and planners can 
leverage known probability in their favor to attempt to narrow the gap between 
known and unknown, and this will result in better preparedness.  Instead of 
prioritizing being purely subjective, it can be objective and scientific.  This will not 
remove the commander’s ability to influence his training.  He/she still has the 
ability to “weight” certain tasks based upon experiences and personal 
preferences.  Incorporating subjective intent with objective probabilities will 
produce a more objective result, and will enable the Leader to make decisions 
that will be more accurate, but still tailored to his/her intent.  The odds will be in 
the Soldiers’ favor. 
Imagine it were possible to truncate a unit’s First 100 Days after arriving to 
the theater of operations.  What if it the “new” unit arriving to its area of 
operations had the same proficiency in mission essential skills as the unit it was 
replacing?  When, as it always does expecting to inflict casualties, the enemy 
tested that new unit, instead U.S. forces would be in a position to react as if they 
had been there all along and soundly defeat the enemy.  Beyond kinetic 
considerations, newly arrived units would be prepared to assume missions and 
responsibilities sooner, so that the efforts of previous units were not lost or 
temporarily delayed because Soldiers were still learning individual skills.  From 
the perspective of the civilian populace, there would be synergy of effort.  The 
author of this thesis believes that it is possible for a deploying Leader to seek 
inputs from his/her deployed counterpart that would enable tailoring of 
homestation training to produce the required skills that would enable survivability, 
lethality, and effectiveness.  There would be no perceived gap in proficiency for 
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II. THE DILEMMA OF TRAINING TASK SELECTION 
There is not enough time to do everything.  Each commander will 
have to determine wisely what is essential, and assign 
responsibilities for accomplishment.  He should spend the 
remaining time on near-essentials.2 
       —General Bruce C. Clark 
    Guidelines for the Leader and the Commander 
A. BACKGROUND 
The purpose of pre-deployment training is to prepare Soldiers to conduct 
the missions they will execute while deployed.  Even though environments and 
enemies morph over time, pre-deployment training should, at the very least, arm 
Soldiers with the requisite skills they need to be initially effective and survivable 
in the operational environment, and thus able to adapt and refine their abilities as 
the situation develops.  If pre-deployment training is inadequate, a unit would 
arrive to its operational area without the requisite skills and initially be attempting 
to catch up to enemy forces to match their proficiency.  Soldiers would hit the 
ground at a disadvantage to the enemy, instead of being able to arrive equal, 
identify, adapt, and surpass.  Due to the ever-changing environment, it is 
completely unrealistic to expect any training plan conducted now to be 
completely sufficient later for the duration of a deployment.   
However, it is possible to better attempt to close the gap between the 
known and unknowns, thus increasing effectiveness and survivability.  Among 
the different branches in the Army, there are, on average, more than two hundred 
individual and collective training tasks to prepare Soldiers for deployment.  The 
dilemma thus becomes: On what tasks should a leader train his/her unit?  In 
 
2 GEN Bruce C. Clark, Guidelines for the Leader and the Commander (Mechanicsburg, PA: 
Stackpole Books, 1968), 50. 
addition, pursuant to this, what allocation of time or priority should he/she assign 
to each task?  The contemporary operating environment is constrained by 
resources, knowledge, and biases, and this limits the decisions of the leader 
when answering these questions.  A graphical representation of the effects of 
influences on training is below.  
 
 
Figure 1. THE EFFECTS OF INFLUENCES ON TRAINING PLANS 
Units begin with myriad mission essential tasks that they should train.  The 
training plan is affected, primarily, by resources, but also by the influences of 
situational awareness and personal bias.  Ideally, if units were making more 
optimal decisions, the resulting influenced training plans would be tailored 
effectively to the environment and consistent with available means.  However, 
this is often not the case, and when any one influence dominates the rationale, 
improper training may result.  
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The intent of this research is to confirm the presence of influencers on 
training, and then to develop a mathematical model to optimize the choices of 
training to produce the greatest utility later during deployment.  The underlying 
belief driving this question is that leaders sometimes make less than optimal 
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decisions because of bias, lack of knowledge, and resource limitations.  Before 
proceeding to develop a working model, the author first needed to confirm or 
deny that shortcomings exist in training as a result of the independent variables.  

























Figure 2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
According to this model, when units have unlimited training resources, and 
they are informed about their environment, they will conduct the most effective 
training.  As situational awareness decreases, the decisions a unit makes 
become more arbitrary.  In the worst case, a unit has limited training resources 
available.  The most dangerous combination occurs when a unit has limited 
resources and is also uninformed because a unit only does what it can with 
available resources and does not know better, not what it should. 
The three independent variables affecting the dependent variable (utility of 
training) are: personal preferences, constraints in the training environment (time  
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and available resources), and situational awareness (with regard to the area of 
operations for which a unit is destined).  The causal mechanisms for each 
independent variable are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. PERSONAL PREFERENCE CAUSAL MECHANISM 
1. Personal preferences can have a large impact on the training a unit 
conducts.  The Commander has the final say on what his/her unit trains on.  If a 
certain commander is very proficient at and knowledgeable about certain tasks, 
then he/she is likely to emphasize those in the training plan.  If the commander 
has perfect knowledge, and is not constrained by resources, then this influence is 
favorable.  However, the opposite is also true: he/she has the potential to steer a 
unit’s training in the wrong direction and produce less optimal outcomes later.  
The causal argument is as follows: Personal preference produces bias towards 
or away from some tasks.  This leads to either selection or non-selection for 
inclusion in the training plan.  See Figure 3.  Preferred tasks are selected and 
allocated more time.  Lesser or non-preferred tasks are allocated less time.  
Negative bias leads to non-selection and no allocation of time and effort.  Overall, 
preferences can shape pre-deployment training, which will affect performance 
later during the mission.   
Indications of personal preference dominating training would be a 
preponderance of effort devoted to narrowly focused areas over combinations of 
other areas (a unit spending so much time on one task to the exclusion of others 
with no other factor causing that exclusion).  Another indicator would be a 
training plan that varies little from the Commander’s Philosophy—usually a 
published statement by the Commander outlining what he views as his “Essential 
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Skills.”  For example, many commanders state that their “Big 4” are: Physical 
Training, Marksmanship, First Aid, and Small Unit Tactics.  Outlining a 
commander’s focus areas is important, as it gives subordinates his intent.  
However, if planners take this too literally and only focus on these skill areas, 
they risk ignoring other less prominent skills.  The potential outcome is that a unit 
is very good at the wrong skill set.  Sometimes units focus on certain tasks based 
on their previous experience or last rotation.  As a result, they train for the 
previous fight and fail to adapt to the new environment.  Another indicator is the 
culture of a unit.  Often, from talking to subordinate members of a unit, it is very 
easy to discern the attitude of the commander and what his/her priorities are.  
When members brag about spending extensive time on certain tasks, and about 
having mastered some tasks, while speaking derisively about other tasks, this is 
an indicator that personal preferences may have affected training.    
 
Figure 4. AVAILABLE RESOURCES CAUSAL MECHANISM 
2. Arguably, the most dominant factor affecting training plans and 
execution of those plans are the resources available to a unit.  See Figure 4.  
Simply put, if there is not enough time available to train certain tasks, they will not 
be trained.  Similarly, if a unit cannot secure use of a range that allows specific 
training, then that task will not be trained.  Time and land are two finite resources 
when multiple units are competing for the same training.  Sometimes it is easier 
to train the less time-intensive task because schedules preclude devoting 
excessive time to planning and execution of other training.  Similarly, if a range 
cannot be reserved or shared with another unit, whatever task that was planned 
for that range may be pushed further right on the schedule with the hope that 
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there will be time to come back to it later.  The causal argument here is that the 
availability of training resources such as time, land (ranges), money, ammunition, 
training aids, enablers (outside experts) imposes limitations on the scope of 
plans that a unit makes.  Depending on the severity of these limitations, a unit 
may select tasks that only require whatever level of resources is available.  
Overall, these resource-driven selections will shape the training a unit conducts. 
At the same time, even after a unit makes decent plans maximizing ample 
anticipated resources, often it is later forced to modify the plan when one or more 
of the planned resources is unavailable.  For example, a unit may not receive the 
allocation of ammunition that it was expecting, or some external event may trump 
a planned training event and reduce or eliminate the time originally allocated to 
some training.  Alternatively, a higher-priority unit may take a range from the 
original unit, and the planned training is now modified or canceled.   
Indicators of resources driving training are plans made out of necessity.  If 
an operations officer states that he/she made decisions because he/she knew 
that a required element would not be available, this is the key indicator.  Also, if 
examination of the training actually conducted varies greatly from the planned 
training, and the explanation given was that some resource fell through, this 
would be equally indicative.  Another indicator is less time allocated to complex 
tasks, while more time is allocated to simple tasks.  This could show that a unit 
attempted to expose itself to something but was not able to invest the requisite 
time.  Instead, more effort may be devoted to simpler, less costly training. 
 
Figure 5. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CAUSAL MECHANISM 
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3.  Situational awareness about an intended area of operations can lead to 
either a fit or misfit of training.  A unit can properly design its training to meet 
threats when it knows what to expect.  The causal argument is as follows: correct 
and accurate knowledge provides an appreciation of the likelihood of certain 
events occurring.  See Figure 5.  As a result, the operations officer will select 
tasks that he/she expects to occur and focus on those, while devoting less time 
to tasks that are less likely to occur.  On the other hand, if a unit does not know 
what to expect, or expects something very different, it will devote time to tasks 
that it may rarely do, to the exclusion of tasks that have regular occurrence. 
Leaders and subordinates often comment, “I wish I had…” or “Fortunately, 
we expected this and we spent a lot of time…”  These are the best indicators of 
improper and proper prior situational awareness on the part of commanders and 
operations officers.  Another indicator is simply the answer to the question: How 
much did you research recent trends in your area of operations and design 
training around those trends?  
The most difficult indicators to determine are those of high and low utility 
on the dependent variable—quantifying successful predeployment training.  High 
utility could be evidenced by successful mission execution; low utility indicated by 
less successful execution or mission failure.   This can easily become a source of 
bias because senior personnel in a unit will rarely describe their unit unfavorably.  
Similarly, measuring only the amount of casualties a unit sustains is inaccurate; 
units that do not put themselves in risky situations will suffer fewer casualties.  
However, sometimes units receive citations or public recognition for their 
performance.  Therefore, the best indicator of utility would be responses from the 
subordinates who received the training and then executed missions.  If they 
describe relative comfort and confidence in doing their jobs, then they were most 
likely properly prepared.  As well, subordinates are less likely to display 
organizational bias when speaking about themselves.  
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The initial intent of the mathematical model is to confirm the hypotheses 
by demonstrating the theoretical effects proposed in the hypotheses by using 
artificial data that describes situations in which preferences, knowledge, and 
resource constraints are present.  The model will indicate trends towards training 
tasks that coincide with the presence of the independent variables, and will 
indicate how each plan with a large presence of each of the variables will have 
biased outcomes relevant to the independent variables.  
It is possible to modify the math model and make it intuitive and user-
friendly, and more importantly—user specific.  By doing so, it may provide units a 
tool into which they could input preferences, probabilities, and resource 
constraints that would provide an output indicating the relative ratios of effort that 
should be applied to each task given that unit’s specific environmental conditions.  
Using an optimization program with utility theory and probability, preference, and 
cost weighting, the model would reduce the guesswork when planning training. 
Every leader strives to plan and conduct the best training to make his/her 
subordinates the most survivable and effective.  The intent of this research is 
NOT to critique units and second-guess their decisions.  Rather, it is to examine 
what influences decisions and highlight for commanders and planners what the 
results of those influences are.  Much of the current debate on pre-deployment 
training is at the macro level—focusing on the context of the counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operational environment and developing the proper mindset to deal with 
complex situations.  One commander wrote, “Training must also be focused on 
decision-making and taking initiative in a stressful environment. We must develop 
strong small units with leaders (and Soldiers!) who can think fast, decide, and 
execute.”3  Very little discussion exists focusing on the micro-level – how do 
leaders ensure that Soldiers receive training on the correct mix of basic skills, 
given constraints.  Today’s Soldiers and their leaders train hard for every  
 
 
3 CPT Todd J. Clark, Train for the Fight, 2003), 2. 
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mission; this thesis does not question the effectiveness of that training or those 
doing it.  The aim of this research is to determine if the task selection for training 
is optimal. 
More accurate task selection during homestation training is the key to 
making units able to assume new missions sooner.  If Leaders are able to 
balance all the influences in the contemporary operating environment and make 
training realistic and relevant, Soldiers will be initially more proficient in mission 
essential skills upon deploying.  They will begin their deployment with skills on 
par with the previous unit and not have to undergo a period of learning.  As a 
result, Soldiers will be better prepared to separate the enemy from the populace 
and execute population-focused missions sooner to maintain momentum and 
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III. THE SCIENCE OF TRAINING 
Good leaders understand that they cannot train on everything; 
therefore, they focus on training the most important tasks. Leaders 
do not accept substandard performance in order to complete all 
tasks on the training schedule. Training a few tasks to standard is 
preferable to training more tasks below standard.4 
    —FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations 
A. DOCTRINAL LITERATURE 
Little conceptual literature exists on the topic of pre-deployment training 
for the current fight.  Authors have identified that a new mindset is necessary for 
the operating environment, but the discussion is broad and focused on the 
context of the environment, not the specifics of what to train.  Even more 
importantly, while the literature does address that we need to train differently, it 
does not offer a way of doing it effectively, given the constraints in the 
contemporary operating environment.  Given that the Army has only recently 
acknowledged and addressed the new requirements, perhaps it is still a bridge 
too far to expect it to provide “the way.”  Everyone agrees that Soldiers and 
Leaders need to train differently, but none of the authorities offer a solid way to 
do it comprehensively while facing realistic limitations.   
This is not to say that senior leadership should or needs to hold leaders’ 
hands and provide the approved solution for overcoming obstacles.  Part of being 
the adaptive leader that the current conflict requires is innovating new ways of 
training and completing the mission against high odds.  However, the Army is still 
outlining a problem (the ends), only vaguely describing the method (the ways), 
but not discussing the method (the means) to reach the endstate.     
 
4 U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, FM 7-0 (Training for Full Spectrum Operations) 
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 2–8. 
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1. Army Training Strategy (ATS) 
On 12 November 2009, the Department of the Army published the Army 
Training Strategy (ATS).  The intent of this document was to establish the means 
and method by which to “adapt Army training programs to an era of persistent 
conflict, to prepare units and leaders to conduct Full Spectrum Operations (FSO), 
and to rebuild strategic depth ….”5  The document describes the importance that 
the Chief of Staff of the Army attaches to proficiency in conducting operations 
across the spectrum, from against irregular threats among indigenous 
populations, to against a near-peer conventional adversary in major combat 
operations, and the resulting necessity to train efficiently for Full Spectrum 
Operations within the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) construct.  The 
overall intent is to make maximum use of existing and emerging technologies to 
streamline and enhance training given a constrained contemporary operating 
environment. 
The document encourages a change in thinking among leaders regarding 
how to prepare units to conduct full-spectrum operations.6  It is important that “… 
we think fundamentally differently about unit METL, individual training and 
education, and leader development.”7  A key assumption in this document is that 
“… units will have sufficient time to train to Full Spectrum Operations across the 
spectrum of conflict and not just focus on achieving proficiency for the directed 
mission.”8  This in itself is a dangerous assumption.  Given that the Army is 
operating with insufficient dwell time at home, the Army Training Strategy 
specifies that units must train differently to gain the most value of every training 
 
5Army G-3/7, Army Training Strategy (ATS) (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 12 
November 2009), 2. 
6 Ibid., 4. 
7 Ibid., 4. 
8 Ibid., 3. 
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opportunity, and the Army Chief of Staff wants Leaders to “Do a few tasks very 
well rather than checking the block on a ‘laundry list.’”9   
At the start of research for this thesis, the Army was still operating under 
the Core Mission Essential Task List/Directed Mission Essential Task List 
(CMETL/DMETL) construct.  A Core Task is any task specific to a unit’s branch 
or function.  For example, a core task of an artilleryman is to provide indirect fires 
on the battlefield, whereas a military police unit would provide law enforcement.  
On the other hand, a Directed Task is one that a unit must be able to perform for 
a directed mission.  These tasks are branch immaterial; for example, all units 
operating in Afghanistan or Iraq have the directed task of reacting to improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs).   
With the adoption of FSO METLs effective 1 January 2010—combining 
Core and Directed METLs into one unit METL—most units should have only one 
METL, and therefore be able to focus on fewer key tasks. The intent is clear, and 
conceptually, it makes sense.  However, this is still broad overarching guidance. 
Even though the document references units having limited time and resources 
numerous times, it is still only redefining a known problem: the need to prepare 
for complex situations while having only limited resources.  Of these fewer tasks 
—and there are still more to train than time permits—leaders still need to 
prioritize those that are mission critical.   
For example, the Strategy suggests that units should focus on new 
equipment training and crew and team certification/training during the reset 
period.  This is de jure.  De facto, every unit interviewed for this thesis indicated 
that they were missing a large percentage of their leaders for these crews and 
teams during reset, and that they did not begin receiving new equipment until late 
in the train/ready period.  When interviewed about preparing his BCT for 
deployment and asked if he could have done it in less than 18 months, COL 
 
9Army G-3/7, Army Training Strategy (ATS) (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 12 
November 2009), 6. 
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Nicholson’s reply underlined how much ARFORGEN can affect training:  “That 
would have been tough. A lot of the ARFORGEN is spent on personnel and 
equipping issues. I think you need a minimum of 18 months.”10  This should not 
be a surprise; ARFORGEN describes the first months back as devoted to 
individual training and Soldier/family recuperation.  Estimates of key leader 
turnover run as high as 40% in some units due to PCS and ETS, and the 
replacement leaders do not always arrive as the incumbent leaders leave.     
The ATS devotes approximately half of a page to discussion of resources.  
It acknowledges that resources are finite and that resources flow between the 
generating forces and the operating forces as units progress through 
ARFORGEN.  However, with these two caveats alone, the ATS still specifies that 
the Army must adequately train units under conditions similar to those in the 
operating environment.11  Leaders know this, and will do everything to meet that 
intent.  Yet, the limiting factors of time and resources remain.  
With the contemporary operating environment being constrained by time 
and other resources, the general strategy to plan focused training for a 
deployment remains to concentrate on the “deployed mission environment” when 
framing the problem.  It is prudent to encourage a change in thinking in leaders.  
Today, they need to prepare their units to conduct myriad missions in various 
environments since the United States will not have the luxury of choosing the 
battlefield for the next fight.  The question remains: How does a commander 
operationalize this?  
2. FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations 
Current Army doctrine, such as FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum 
Operations, tangentially addresses Army training for the COIN environment.  
 
10 COL John Nicholson, OEF Interview 3BCT 10th MTN CDR, ed. Center for Army Lessons 
Learned, Vol. II (FT Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 8 November 2007), 3. 
11 Army G-3/7, Army Training Strategy (ATS), 17–18. 
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Published on 12 December 2008, FM 7-0 addresses training units to conduct 
operations across the spectrum of conflict from stability operations to major 
combat operations.  However, it does not specify what to train; rather, it 
discusses conceptually how units should approach problems, but from a very 
macro scale.  As an example, FM 7-0 discusses “The Aim Point.”  This is the 
Army’s goal, that “… Army training and leader development must shift leftward 
from the right side of the spectrum of conflict—from training under conditions of 
general war to conditions midway between general war and insurgency.”12 The 
intent of this is to shift the Army’s emphasis from all of one type of training or 
another.  Instead, by attempting to train a blend of both, this enables Army forces 
to sustain the proficiency in irregular warfare and limited intervention developed 
over the last seven years of conflict while sustaining their capability for major 
combat operations.  How does one operationalize “shifting leftward” from the 
right side of the spectrum to the midpoint?       
The challenge for leaders today is conducting training that develops 
proficiency in all elements of full spectrum operations—from stability operations 
in permissive environments to major combat operations in hostile 
environments.13  To what tasks does a leader devote the preponderance of 
effort?  Every leader’s ultimate goals are to complete the mission and bring all of 
his/her Soldiers home, and therefore every bit of training time is precious towards 
achieving those goals.  The Counterinsurgency field manual addresses the need 
to train for varied missions, but does not come any closer towards orienting a 
leader to accomplish this.     
A useful piece of guidance, though general and still challenging to 
operationalize, is that commanders need to tailor training: “As units prepare for 
deployment, commanders adapt training priorities to address tasks required by 
 
12 U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, FM 7-0 (Training for Full Spectrum Operations), 1–6. 
13 Ibid., 1–7. 
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actual or anticipated operations.”14  This is to be expected, however, that units 
should train on that which they will execute.  The question remains: Who knows 
what units will execute?  Is it even possible to know?  Is there a method, or is a 
gut-instinct call made by the leader?  
Training for Full Spectrum Operations discusses Army Force Generation 
(ARFORGEN) and the role it plays in preparing units to conduct missions.   
“Army Training Management,” discusses Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).  
ARFORGEN is the “…process that progressively builds unit readiness over time 
during predictable periods of availability to provide trained, ready, and cohesive 
units prepared for operational deployments.”15  This process takes units through 
three cycles in order to develop readiness: reset, train/ready, and available.   
Upon returning from deployment, units enter the reset phase.  During this 
phase, as units replace equipment and personnel rotate in and out of the unit, the 
unit focuses on training individual tasks.  Typically, due to large personnel 
shortages and necessary physical and emotional recuperation time for Soldiers 
and their families, dedicated training beyond basic individual tasks is minimal. 
The train/ready phase prepares units for higher-level collective training in 
preparation for deployment.  In theory, at this point, a unit has received its fill of 
necessary leaders and Soldiers, and replacement equipment, and can now focus 
on achieving capability to perform a directed mission.  At the end of this phase, a 
unit is supposed to be manned, equipped, and trained for employment.  What is 
not mentioned in the doctrine is new equipment fielding (NEF) and new 
equipment training (NET).  This is the process by which industry and the 
institutional Army has accelerated getting new capabilities and equipment into 
the hands of Soldiers for deployment.  Often, this equipment provides a new 
capability and due to not previously having been fielded to a unit, requires 
considerable training for Soldiers from dedicated contractor personnel.   
 
14 U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, FM 7-0 (Training for Full Spectrum Operations), 1–5. 
15 Ibid., 4–1. 
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In addition to omission of new equipment fielding from the doctrine, lack of 
key personnel backfill and manning is not discussed.  This will be discussed at 
the end of this thesis. 
In the available phase, units are either deploying, or are ready for 
immediate deployment.  When a modular unit such as a brigade combat team 
receives orders for deployment, it may be assigned or attached to the operational 
command of a different headquarters other than its habitual administrative control 
headquarters.  The gaining operational commander can then plan and develop 
plans for training units on his/her mission essential tasks.  Regardless of whether 
the administrative or operational commander has control of a unit at the time, it is 
the unit commander’s ultimate responsibility to ensure that the unit is trained and 
ready for the mission.  
With limited resources, particularly time, units cannot train to standard on 
every task for all operations across the spectrum of conflict.  Leaders must focus 
training on the most important tasks to prepare their units to conduct operations.  
They achieve this focus through use of a mission-essential task list (METL): a 
compilation of mission-essential tasks that an organization must perform 
successfully to accomplish its doctrinal or directed mission.16  Using mission 
focus—deriving training for those essential tasks from a unit’s mission, 
commanders prepare their units and allocate resources such as time, money, 
fuel, and land (ranges) to train tasks critical for mission accomplishment.   
Commanders develop their METLs from a combination of dialogue with 
their next higher commander about his/her directed METL, their own core METL, 
and their own analysis of the mission they will be conducting.  This part is the 
most important challenge for leaders: focusing effort and resources on those 
tasks assessed as needing the most training.  To do this, commanders must 
determine: 
 
16 U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, FM 7-0 (Training for Full Spectrum Operations), 4–5.  
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 - Tasks requiring training 
 - Priority of training effort 
 - How to replicate operational conditions 
 - Risks of not training certain tasks17     
Key to a commander being able to make these determinations is 
understanding the expected conditions and properly framing the problem or 
situation in which his/her unit will operate. Commanders use multiple inputs to 
guide their decisions: guidance from higher headquarters, conditions in the 
operational environment, dialogue with their commander, and their own staff’s 
analysis of the mission.   
While FM 7-0 does provide useful guidance for achieving mission focus 
and developing METLs, there are shortcomings.  FM 7-0 indicates inputs to the 
commander’s directed METL development technique such as orders, plans, the 
anticipated operational environment, publications and doctrine, and external 
guidance.  Interestingly, whereas specific doctrine such as regulations and 
manuals are mentioned by name, timely and relevant publications such as after 
action reviews (AARs) and monographs from the Army’s Center for Army 
Lessons Learned (CALL) are not suggested as valid sources of information.  
Similarly, plans, directives, and guidance from higher commanders are 
mentioned, but cross-dialogue with the unit in the anticipated operational area is 
not.  While peer input should not trump commander’s intent, there is no reason 
that communication with the deployed unit should be excluded as a valid 
influence on framing the environment and steering training.  
Similarly, while the Army Training Management model describes a 
framework to achieve proficiency in mission-essential tasks using a top-down 
and bottom-up approach to planning and executing training, the focus is 
collaboration internal to the unit.  Organizational bias or culture should not inhibit 
 
17U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, FM 7-0 (Training for Full Spectrum Operations), 4–6.  
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a commander from seeking and implementing input from a deployed unit 
conducting that unit’s future mission, provided this input does not specifically 
conflict with the next higher commander’s intent. 
The other major obstacles to training units—either for major combat 
operations or conflicts further to the left on the spectrum of conflict—are the real-
world limitations of ARFORGEN.  Interviews with numerous leaders, from 1SG to 
brigade commander, of deploying and recently re-deployed units, indicated that 
ARFORGEN—while good in intent, is not synchronized with unit schedules.  
Every leader commented that there was always tradeoff and shortcomings when 
training squads, crews, and platoons when key personnel—even leaders—were 
not available during critical training periods.  In addition, the unit would receive a  
majority of new equipment after its mission rehearsal exercise (MRX).  Multiple 
units received and assigned key leaders such as senior NCOs, platoon leaders, 
and company commanders after their MRX and just prior to deployment. 
Two brigades interviewed were originally on orders for Iraq but received a 
late change of mission for Afghanistan.  As a result, their priority for manning and 
equipping was downgraded.  One of these units was told verbally that they were 
deploying to Afghanistan, but without written deployment orders, was officially 
restricted from requesting and receiving resources and funding to prepare for the 
Afghanistan operational environment.  While most everyone in the unit—and on 
the installation for that matter—knew the unit had been “off-ramped” from Iraq 
and “on-ramped” for Afghanistan, the unit was forbidden from making any public 
statements about the change.  The same limitations affected the unit’s ability to 
request training support from its higher headquarters one and two levels up.  
Fortunately, the brigade commanders and operations officers for these brigades 
were able to work among and between the constraints imposed upon them and 
still prepare their units for what they knew was coming.  The way in which one 
operations officer described his maneuvering to obtain needed resources for a 
directed mission that was directed in all but written word could best be described 
as a kabuki dance.  
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“We basically did it on our own.”  One brigade commander, being a tenant 
unit at one post with his higher headquarters at another post, personally 
resourced his unit’s training.  He dealt directly with FORSCOM for guidance on 
his deployment, with Army G8 (integrates Army funding, fielding, and equipping 
actions) for resourcing, and with an aviation task force from a third post to 
support his training.18  This commander successfully overcame real-world 
constraints of ARFORGEN in the contemporary operating environment, and he 
indicated that, overall, he was satisfied with his unit’s training preparedness.  
However, what about the commander or staff that is not as successful in 
generating options and exploiting opportunities?  ARFORGEN has definite 
limitations.  
The discrepancy is obvious: units train for a mission without the leaders 
that will be leading later, and units later use new equipment for the first time in 
the operational environment instead of being able to train on it in the 
contemporary operating environment.      
No system is perfect, and while FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum 
Operations addresses the mindset to prepare units for deployment, and 
ARFORGEN creates a system to man, equip, and train units for conducting 
missions, there are still large gaps between prescribed intent and execution.  It is 
still a leader’s responsibility to mitigate these discrepancies and prepare his/her 
Soldiers to execute missions.  While this thesis does not argue for a need to 
provide the Army’s leaders with a one-size-fits-all solution to overcoming friction, 
the intent is to show that it is possible to develop a method to meet these various 
intents and directives in a constrained environment with limited information.    
 
18 COL John M. Spiszer, Training Comments on Afghanistan, 9 October 2009. 
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3. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency 
The Army’s latest field manual on Counterinsurgency (COIN), FM 3-24, 
Counterinsurgency, only tangentially addresses proper U.S. predeployment 
training.  The field manual mentions “training,” as related to what U.S. forces 
need to be able to conduct COIN missions, sixteen times.  Only a small minority 
of these specifically referenced in what individual skills Soldiers needed to be 
proficient.  The vast majority of references to training alluded to the type of 
training that host nation security forces required, and therefore implied what U.S. 
forces need to know.   
Specific tasks that FM 3-24 lists as requiring proficiency include: counter-
IED, cultural awareness, basic language, marksmanship, first aid, tactical site 
exploitation, detainee operations, biometric devices, patrolling, indirect fires, and 
working with host nation forces.19  This is an argument that the 
counterinsurgency manual should devote time towards listing out every task a 
deploying Soldier should know.  However, given that it is the manual on 
counterinsurgency, one would expect some assistance to the unit leader on how 
to prepare his/her unit to operate in this type of environment.  Instead, most of 
the training references pertain to what skills U.S forces need to impart upon host 
nation military, paramilitary, and police forces.  The manual only briefly mentions 
what skills U.S. forces need to enhance their own survivability or effectiveness, 
save for language and cultural training.   
FM 3-24 does have some specificity, though.  In the context of specific 
missions, such as conducting cordons and searches, FM 3-24 indicates mission 
essential tasks.20  In the chapter on “Defensive Considerations in  
 
 
19 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2 (Counterinsurgency) (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2009). 
20 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2 (Counterinsurgency), 5–11, 12. 
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Counterinsurgency,” FM 3-24 lists actions and tasks that units must be prepared 
to do in order to defend bases, and counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 
snipers, ambushes, and drive-by shootings.21     
The other focus area in FM 3-24 that provides some guidance to Soldiers 
deploying into a COIN environment is the chapter on supporting host nation (HN) 
security forces.  Cultural awareness, language skills, and being able to partner 
with HN forces, as well as individual proficiency in basic Soldier skills such as 
marksmanship, first aid, intelligence, and use of indirect fires are necessary to 
conduct the mission.22    
The Counterinsurgency manual emphasizes the COIN environment and 
how to train host nation units to conduct COIN.  This manual probably comes the 
closest of any Army reference in describing how to prepare Soldiers, but again, it 
primarily specifies what to prepare Soldiers to train others to do, not what they 
themselves need to be prepared to do.     
B. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
The primary source of literature on the topic of effective pre-deployment 
training is the body of after action reviews (AARs), Lessons Learned, 
monographs, and articles written by Soldiers and leaders who have deployed.  
The United States Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) publishes a majority 
of these documents.  The Army developed the CALL as a method of identifying 
“best practices” as leaders across the Army identified that the enemy we face is 
as adaptive as us, and the Army realized it needed to capture and disseminate 
lessons learned across the force to prepare the next set of leaders preparing to 
deploy.  As such, there are hundreds of documents, and the number increases 
daily.  In addition, the Combat Studies Institute is another forum sponsored by 
the Army that is analyzing trends and experiences and developing new 
                                            
21 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2 (Counterinsurgency), 6–1, 30. 
22 Ibid., 8–6, 17. 
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approaches.  Though dealing primarily with the subject of counterinsurgency 
(COIN), forums such as the Small Wars Journal contain hundreds of articles and 
monographs written by leaders describing their impressions based upon 
experiences.  While these documents rarely directly assess the effectiveness of 
training, they do offer insights into how prepared units were to conduct missions.    
Overall, my literature review of the published first-hand accounts 
mentioned above sometimes indicates situations in which there is a misfit 
between the training done in preparation and the actual missions conducted.  
However, the number of documents that specifically address training and how 
training was designed are extremely minimal.  The vast majority of documents 
discusses training only generally, and only tangentially explains how priorities 
were assigned for a given area of operations.  In short, the literature identifies 
that the “What” of proper training exists, but not “Why” or “How.” 
For clarity and simplicity, analysis of the empirical literature is broken 
down into three major categories of training conducted or required to be able to 
Shoot, Move, or Communicate.  A general section on methodology or influences 
is also included. 
1. Shoot 
Undoubtedly, individual marksmanship, and facility with all available 
weapon systems and fires platforms is of primary importance for Soldiers in 
Afghanistan.  Soldiers and Leaders at all levels stress the importance of 
proficiency with assigned individual and crew-served weapons.  Many writers 
stressed the importance of unit members being cross-trained in all weapon 
systems in the event the assigned gunner is sick, on leave, or incapacitated.  
Most important is the growing trend that all Soldiers, to include truck drivers, 
artillerymen, logisticians, and intelligence—not just combat arms, are employing 
weapons that were formally the domain of infantrymen, cavalrymen, and military 
police.  COL Charles Preysler, Commander, 173rd ABN BDE, in Afghanistan, 
wrote that,  
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The other thing we did which paid dividends was to make all 
Soldiers into riflemen first. Everyone in this units fights, everyone in 
this unit is a rifleman. You just never know what may happen. As it 
turned out, we have many of our Soldiers operating outside their 
MOS and conducting operations that make them riflemen first. Half 
the artillery battalion is out there maneuvering as infantry. The 
BTSB is holding the critical ground for me, maneuvering, like 
infantry with the engineer company and the MPs.23   
According to the Spartan brigade commander (3/10th Mountain),  
Regardless of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), all Soldiers 
received extensive marksmanship training. The training proved its 
value in theater when the Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB), 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition (RSTA) 
Squadron, and Field Artillery (FA) operated as additional maneuver 
battalions and were in direct fire engagements.24  
CPT Shelia Matthews, a Quartermaster company commander, wrote, 
Our TTP during engagements with the enemy was to maintain 
contact until the enemy was dead or left. Truck drivers must be 
capable drivers, mechanics, and gunners. Each truck commander 
must be proficient with all communication systems. The convoy 
commander will be able to effectively call for fire and communicate 
with CAS. Mount heavy weapons on maneuver and cargo trucks 
(we put a turret and gun on our wrecker) and be prepared to 
provide security for all soft targets (some convoys secured up to 
100 host nation trucks). We utilized a 60mm from one of the 
maneuver companies during extended convoys for enhanced 
firepower.  Cross-training is crucial as there is much area to cover 
with few Soldiers. Not only should the support Soldiers piggyback 
off the maneuver training (e.g. CAS and LWCMS) but also offer 
field maintenance training to the line companies (e.g., hasty 
recovery and changing a half shaft).25  
On crew-served weapons training, a deployed commander commented,  
 
23 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Commander Interviews, Vol. II (FT Leavenworth, KS: 
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, May 2009), 111. 
24 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
Impressions Report (FT Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 26 September 
2007), 18–19. 
25 TF Currahee, Afghan Commander AAR Book (West Point, N.Y.: U.S. Army Center for 
Company-level Leaders, 2009), 21. 
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I would have spent more time creating a solid nucleus of well-
trained (not just familiarized) Soldiers on the M2, MK-19, and M240. 
We were three-deep qualified on crew-served weapons and that 
wasn’t enough. You may get more weapons, and remember that 
people will have to rotate out for leave and injuries, etc. When you 
get into country, spend as much time as possible firing on the range 
to get everyone cross-trained and able to fire effectively and deal 
with things like mis-feeds when under pressure.26  
Just as every Soldier in the Afghanistan theater must be prepared for 
close-quarters combat, they must also be prepared to use and effectively engage 
targets with crew-served weapons.  According to one command sergeant major, 
“Soldiers should be cross-trained on all weapon systems in their unit. The 
possibility for every Soldier to become a MK19 gunner in the mountains of 
Afghanistan is real.”27  All Soldiers should be prepared to take over operation of 
a crew-served weapon if the primary gunner becomes unable to perform his 
duties.  The training must also include loading, charging, firing, and clearing a 
malfunction on the weapons. Soldiers must be trained to properly clear all 
weapons.28  Ensuring this not only makes Soldiers more effective in combat, but 
also safer while employing weapons.  Ultimately, this decreases accidents and 
conserves combat power.   
 Soldiers and Leaders who have deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq 
know that marksmanship is different in both theaters.  One leader in 3rd BCT, 
10th Mountain Division recommended that units limit training on Warrior Battle 
Drill 6 and 6a. His BCT spent a lot of time and ammunition on this drill in 
anticipation of clearing houses in villages on initial entry.  Once deployed, 
however, Afghan National Army (ANA) troops conducted most building entry; it 
was conducted as a “knock and check” rather than a combat operation. Clearing 
a house by the method in battle drill 6 was not productive in COIN except when 
 
26 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Afghan Commander AAR Book (OEF-
7) (West Point, N.Y.: U.S. Army's Center for Company-level Leaders, March 2007), 24. 
27 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan, Vol. 09-37 (FT 
Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Center, June 2009), 47.  
28 Ibid., 50. 
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there was specific intelligence on insurgents that were in the house29  Generally, 
short-range, reflexive fire skills are priority in the mostly urban settings in Iraq.  In 
Afghanistan, however, where the enemy engages U.S. forces from extreme 
ranges, and U.S. forces do not conduct many “hard knock” Battle Drill 6 
missions, and instead let the Afghan National Security Forces take the lead, 
long-range marksmanship is at a premium. 30  While the M68 Close Combat 
Optic (CCO) is effective in close-range environments like those in Iraq, 
Afghanistan requires long-range marksmanship, especially with magnified optics 
such as the Trijicon ACOG.31  Many Soldiers in Afghanistan are issued optics 
and infrared targeting devices for their rifles. Training and practice with them 
should also become a part of the unit’s deployment preparation and/or its 
ongoing training plan in theater. Some of these optics and targeting devices will 
aid in range determination and target acquisition. Leaders must become familiar 
with the positive attributes and liabilities of each system as it is fielded and must 
ensure Soldiers are properly trained on employment and maintenance.32  
A company commander from 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne 
Division wrote leaders need to:  
… send as many troops to long range marksmanship courses as 
possible. If any of your Soldiers get the chance to kill the enemy at 
distance, they need to have the tools and the training to take him 
down. They may only get one shot. Their leaders need to make it 
count.33  
 Just as the requirements for marksmanship skills have morphed and 
increased, so has the need to conduct innovative and realistic training.  Prone 
 
29 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
Impressions Report, 19–20. 
30 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The First 100 Days – Operation Enduring Freedom 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 4. 
31 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
Impressions Report, 19–20. 
32 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan, 48. 
33 TF Currahee, Afghan Commander AAR Book, 48. 
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and foxhole-supported firing is antiquated and of marginal utility in Afghanistan, 
or any combat theater for that matter.  Soldiers must be trained to place accurate 
shots from all types of non-standard firing positions, at varying elevations and 
ranges, from inside, on top of, and outside of vehicles, under physical stress.  
One AAR author indicated the need to train in an area that allows shooting uphill 
such as Fort Irwin, CA.  Most engagements in Afghanistan, RC-East were long 
range, shooting uphill with crew served weapons mounted on vehicles. 34  What 
remains to be seen is if the risk adverse range control personnel who are usually 
former military but whose primary concern these days is securing their jobs will 
be amenable to allowing Commanders and Leaders to design and execute 
rigorous and realistic marksmanship lanes.   
 One deployed commander wrote in a monograph that, 
…Very rarely will a well-rested Soldier conduct an engagement 
from a comfortably prepared fighting position.  As such, we must 
become proficient firing weapons from vehicles, while moving, 
using various types of cover and concealment. Furthermore, 
introducing fatigue, discomfort, or stress in training activities will 
replicate the battlefield. Once again, safety is a pertinent concern, 
but cannot prevent tough, realistic training.35    
One suggestion was the use of blanks during all training exercises to 
simulate carrying a loaded weapon. 
Prior to writing this thesis and after returning from deployment, the author 
engaged in a heated argument with a range control operations officer at Fort 
Bragg over executing a simple combat-style range.  The range involved 
Paratroopers moving laterally across a field fire range in teams engaging targets 
from doorway frames, rooftops, and other alternate firing positions, with the team 
leader directing his personnel and controlling fires.  The range control officer, a 
retired artillery brigade command sergeant major, refused to allow the author to 
 
34 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
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conduct this range because (1) – There was no published reflexive fire standard 
for the Army, and (2) – His responsibility, as he saw it, was to prevent training 
accidents at home station so that “he could sleep well at night.”  When asked 
how the author was supposed to be able to sleep well at night knowing that he 
had not conducted the best training possible for his Paratroopers, the operations 
officer did not have an answer.  The problem remains: risk adverse installation 
personnel making decisions affecting training that should be senior- and junior-
leader dialogue.   
The requirement for realistic and relevant marksmanship training for all 
Soldiers has highlighted a deficiency in the institutional Army regarding 
resourcing.  Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) allocations of 
ammunition may be inadequate to train all Soldiers within a brigade to the same 
standard.  STRAC is designed and published just below the doctrinal level and is 
specific to unit type and weapon system, but needs the flexibility to be increased, 
especially for crew served weapons and traditionally non-combat units.36 
Afghanistan is an indirect fire fight, and Soldiers must be proficient with all 
aspects of mortars and the tools used to bring accurate and timely indirect fires 
on the enemy.  Individual Soldier training on call for fire (CAS, CCA, indirect) and 
using optics such as the LRAS, ITAS, and Mark VII with DAGR will greatly 
increase Soldiers’ accurate employment of indirect fires.  Although many 
firebases and FOBs now employ the system, currently, units are deploying 
without training for lightweight counter-mortar radar (LCMR), which is critical for 
anti-mortar operations. Units must deploy with personnel trained on the systems, 
who can then train Tactical Operations Center (TOC) personnel in LCMR.37  This  
 
 
36 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
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37 United States Forces – Afghanistan, Training Improvement Recommendations for US 
Forces Deploying to Afghanistan (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters, United States Forces 
Afghanistan, 6 December 2009), 7. 
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radar, when setup, maintained, and correctly integrated in TOC operations, 
allows timely and accurate counter fires against enemy rocket and mortar points 
of origin (POOs).   
 Mortars have traditionally been the most responsive fire support weapon 
available to any commander, and even more so in Afghanistan with often 
extended clearance of fires required for tube artillery, or the often frustrating 
requirement to have a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) present to conduct 
Type 1 close air support missions.  Maneuver battalions employ 120mm, 81mm, 
and 60mm mortars.  Patrols, both mounted and dismounted, often carry the 
60mm mortars for immediate fire suppression missions.  However, the limiting 
factor is the availability of trained MOS 11C mortarmen.  Deployed units have 
identified the requirement to cross train all members of maneuver units on the 
60mm mortar system.  Train Soldiers in mortar platoons to operate as single gun 
crews attached to maneuver companies and platoons. Cross train all crews on all 
mortar types and train NCOs as FSOs so they can both direct the gun crew and 
assist the commander in planning fire support. 38  
 The 10th Mountain Division later identified in their AAR the requirement to 
build additional mortar capability.  While a light Infantry Battalion has only one 
MTOE mortar platoon, during deployment training, units quickly realized the 
benefit of having immediate fire support at the company level.  Additional 
sections needed to be formed, and units trained mortars to operate in 
independent sections with habitual relationships to maneuver units. They 
identified that the biggest hurdle to overcome to gain this flexibility is to get 
several of the NCOs Fire Direction Center (FDC) qualified and to acquire as 
much experience as possible. This will be a challenge and manning will need to 
be creative but the payoff is definitely worth it.39  All mortar crew members should 
 
38 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
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39 10th Mountain Division, CJTF-76 Lessons Learned, Vol. 05FEB06-02FEB07 (FT Drum, 
N.Y.: 10th Mountain Division, 2007), 198–199. 
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be trained to fill any position and qualified on all mortar types. The extensive 
training paid benefits as commanders’ detached mortars to platoon level to 
provide direct support for outposts. Mortars or artillery accounted for an 
estimated 70% of enemy KIA.40 
 Additionally, units with medium and heavy mortars (81mm and 120mm) in 
mortar firing positions indicate the need to train personnel outside the mortar 
crews to man the systems so that units will have continuous mortar capability.  
Fires need to be precise.  “Employment of mortars in combat operations has 
shown firing close to target is not good enough …. Poor precision can lead to 
civilian casualties or fratricide.”41  In a counterinsurgency, the Army cannot risk 
inaccurate fires, but at the same time, cannot afford to give up the ability to 
provide indirect fires when the doctrinal manning is not available. 
 Just as units must be able to continuously man all mortar systems, they 
must be able to always have an observer available to call for and adjust fires.  In 
their initial impressions report, 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division identified the 
issue of universal observer indirect fire training to all units assigned in the area of 
operations.  The authors indicated that indirect fires are very responsive and 
have accounted for a large number of enemy KIA in RC-East during OEF VII. 
Soldiers must be able to conduct a Call For Fire (CFF) at all times. Conducting a 
CFF is a Level 2 Skill for all Soldiers regardless of MOS.  This requirement is due 
to the fact that in many situations the assigned forward observer (FO) team is 
unable to observe the actual enemy contact with the friendly unit due to terrain. 
In these instances a non-13F MOS Soldier is responsible for initiating the CFF.42  
COL John Spiszer, an infantry brigade commander in Afghanistan, wrote in his 
training comments on Afghanistan published on the Army’s CALL Web site that   
 
40 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
Impressions Report, 19. 
41 United States Forces – Afghanistan, Training Improvement Recommendations for US 
Forces Deploying to Afghanistan, 8–9. 
42 10th Mountain Division, CJTF-76 Lessons Learned, 181. 
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The other challenging thing you needed really do at home station is 
integrating all your fires. When you are in real serious enemy 
contact here the guys at the company and platoon level are 
employing Close Air Support, attack helicopters, 155 howitzers, 120 
MM mortars, 60 MM mortars, along with their direct fires and 
maneuver at the same time and all are danger close.43 
 Aaron Swain, a commander, wrote,  
Everyone must learn to fire every weapon system. Teams must 
always be in position to rapidly support each-other with direct fires. 
Put forward observers and medics with all patrols, even team level 
operations. Bring the 60mm mortars or 1 x tube of 120mm with you. 
Mortars and snipers kill in mountainous terrain. Know where your 
indirect fire bubble is and move your priority target as you move. All 
FOs, RTOs, and Leaders will talk to attack helicopters. Teach them 
how.44 
   As indicated above, another invaluable fires asset responsible for 
decisively finishing many engagements and saving countless Soldiers’ lives, is 
attack aviation, particularly rotary-wing.  Without a doubt, fixed-wing close air 
support has contributed greatly on many occasions.  But due to the requirements 
to have an Air Force JTAC, or both a trained Joint Fires Observer (JFO) and a 
JTAC to conduct Type 2 missions, a well-marked enemy for an available loitering 
CAS platform, and the necessity to employ munitions from jets only in extreme 
situations so as to limit collateral damage and protect innocent civilians, Marine 
and Army attack helicopters are often the weapon of choice.  Close combat  
attack (CCA) aircraft—helicopters, are more responsive, provide greater loiter 
times, and allow employment of munitions at much closer ranges to friendly 
forces than fixed wing CAS.   
 Unfortunately, opportunities to conduct joint air/ground training with these 
assets are extremely limited, save for that lucky individual leader in the platoon 
that gets to employ helicopters at the Joint Readiness Training Center.  As a 
 
43 Spiszer, Training Comments on Afghanistan. 
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result, many ground units are initially uncomfortable with, and unable to control 
and accurately direct attack pilots onto the target.  The 10th Mountain Division 
identified in their Lessons Learned, and every redeployed unit would indicate, the 
need for more Air-to-ground integration (AGI) because operations in Afghanistan 
require extensive aviation integration.  Units must train with these assets at home 
station to establish Air SOPs, TTPs, and experience for all Soldiers of all levels. 
This understanding would lead to more realistic planning and integration during 
the execution of combat operations.45  The key to success is training between 
aerial and ground maneuver units.  Conducted regularly, AGI training gives 
ground units a better understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the 
AWT/SWT battalion.46 
Included under the heading of Shoot, thorough training escalation of force 
(EOF) procedures is a necessity.  In an email, COL Spiszer addressed the need 
for EOF.   
EOF procedures are very exact; putting the distances, the cones, 
the spike strips, and using lasers and all those things for three 
reasons: (1) to protect innocent civilians; (2) to help identify those 
who are not innocent; and (3) to allow the Soldiers to protect 
themselves. I don’t have any problems with those types of 
constraints. Sometimes it’s hard to convince the Soldiers of that.47   
Many Soldiers think that EOF rules are designed to limit their ability to 
protect themselves.  Only through proper training to include vignettes and STXs 
will Soldiers be able to learn proper application so that when the time comes for 
them to execute EOF, they will be in a position to do so expertly, efficiently, and 
without any doubts—thereby protecting both themselves and innocent civilians.  
Whether engaged in a firefight, or executing escalation of force procedures,   
 
45 10th Mountain Division, CJTF-76 Lessons Learned, 183. 
46 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan, 72. 
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Soldiers must be ready and able to employ any available weapon system.  
An interesting melding of Shooting and Communicating is this comment by a 
1SG: “Afghanistan requires a unit to understand when to squeeze the trigger and 
when to shake a hand. Situation based scenarios can help develop this 
understanding.  Iraq & Afghanistan experiences are very different.”48  Expert 
marksmanship kills the enemy, saves Soldiers’ lives, and protects civilians. 
2. Move 
For the purposes of this thesis, observations grouped under the category 
of Move include anything related to physical movement of Soldiers across the 
battlefield.  The most recurring themes in the literature about Afghanistan with 
regard to movement of forces are IEDs, the physical terrain, the necessity of air 
movement, and CASEVAC and MEDEVAC.  With Afghanistan’s extremely rough 
terrain, avenues of approach for friendly forces are extremely limited, and the 
enemy knows this.  As a result, what trafficable routes exist can always be 
assumed enemy planned engagement areas.  Every leader who wrote on their 
experience in Afghanistan emphasized that Soldiers had to be mentally and 
physically prepared, and armed with the proper skills to conduct operations in 
Afghanistan’s rough and broken terrain.   
With improvised explosive devices (IEDs) being the primary killer on the 
battlefield today, rigorous and detailed training on counter-IED (CIED) tactics, 
techniques, and procedures is an obvious necessity.  CIED easily ranks among 
the top 3 of most important skills to train, along with marksmanship and cultural 
agility.  Proficiency is not sufficient.  Soldiers must be masters of all things CIED-
related.  Among the not-so-obvious observations and suggestions from deployed 
leaders, one suggested, “Put Soldiers in the role of the insurgent and ask them 
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how they would do it?”49  By gathering the latest enemy techniques and tactics 
for IEDs from veteran Soldiers and small unit leaders, and forcing Soldiers to 
visualize the battlefield through the eyes of the enemy, leaders would be able to 
enhance Soldiers’ critical thinking and advanced thinking in dealing with the IED 
threat.   
Many leaders and Soldiers commented on not receiving adequate hands-
on training with Counter Radio-controlled Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 
Electronic Warfare (CREW) devices.  Some units get their hands on the 
equipment for the first time during Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and 
Integration (RSOI) in Kuwait or Bagram, and then really get familiar with the 
equipment during their left-seat and right-seat rides during relief in place 
operations in their assigned area of operations with the leaving unit.  All 
members of vehicle crews, to include the vehicle commander and gunner must 
be experts at using and maintaining CREW devices.  Moreover, with ever soldier 
potentially riding in a vehicle at some point in Afghanistan, all Soldiers need to 
know how to turn the piece of equipment on, troubleshoot it, and ensure that it is 
functioning properly during a patrol.  CREW training needs to be a regularly 
trained Soldier individual skill so that competency will be enduring throughout the 
Army. 50 
Beyond mastery of CREW devices in vehicles, some units indicate that in 
general there is a shortfall in understanding regarding the capabilities and effects 
of electronic warfare (EW) to combat the IED threat.  Multiple systems exist, both 
ground and airborne, and with a lack of knowledge about capabilities and 
limitations extending from the individual Soldier up to the senior leadership, units  
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…routinely asked for EW to support missions without regard to the 
threat or without relation to a desired effect. Frequently the request 
is for the aircraft and not the effect – or just “give me EW’ without 
regards to the threat, capability and/or TTPs.51   
Leaders and Soldiers need to know what CIED tools are available for 
employment, if Soldiers deploy without this knowledge, the enemy is gaining an 
advantage in his targeting. 
Maneuver units repeatedly comment that Soldiers need to be prepared to 
conduct dismounted operations under the harshest of conditions.  Rough and 
broken terrain, high altitudes, and extremely heavy Soldier loads necessitate 
physical and mental toughness.  Numerous leaders in units from flat terrain at 
home station indicated that they wished they had had the opportunity to train at 
high altitudes in mountainous areas. 52  The homestation contemporary operating 
environment often is not representative of the conditions in Afghanistan.  The 
results of not having done this included injuries and improper physical 
conditioning to sustain operations, pursue the enemy, employ certain mission 
essential equipment, and carry required individual loads during missions.   
One unit suggested that units who know that they will be operating under 
conditions similar to those found in mountainous operating environments should 
develop an extensive mountaineering conditioning program IOT prepare for the 
rigors involved with such terrain.53  One commander commented,  
If I were to focus more on one thing, it would be walking up and 
down mountains with IBA and assault pack or rucksack, for days at 
a time. This is what we do every day. No amount of running, 
calisthenics, or walking on flat ground can prepare your body for 
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mountains, you have to do it regularly, you have to be wearing all of 
your kit (specifically IBA), and you need to do it in all types of 
weather.54   
Another company commander provided a similar insight:  
There is no substitute for soldiers who are in shape and are 
prepared to carry heavy loads. If we were preparing for this all over, 
we would ruck march with the loads that we carry over here. 
Soldiers who were not fit were detrimental to missions in the 
mountains. The possibility of those soldiers getting injured was 
much higher and the negative impact that they had on patrols was 
incredibly significant.55 
In addition to the simple discrepancy of a lack of mountains in the 
contemporary operating environment, some leaders expressed a desire to have 
conducted their preparation in a desert environment such as the National 
Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, as opposed to the swamp and woodland 
environment of the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA.56  
Scheduling a mission rehearsal exercise at a different combined training center 
may not be feasible, and some units’ home station may be nowhere near 
mountains in the United States.  One leader wrote, “If we could have done more 
of one thing, it would be climbing some mountains. Fort Drum does not have any 
terrain with elevation. I would plan for an off-post training event focusing on 
operating at high elevations and mountaineering” 57  For a majority of units this is 
the reality, so they must make every attempt to replicate high altitude rough 
terrain, or send as many Soldiers as possible to training venues that offer this, 
both Army and Marine Corps.  There is no substitute for simple walking: up and 
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down steep hills, carrying heavy loads.  Running and weight lifting will not suffice 
to condition the body to patrol up steep slopes with 100lb loads. 58     
Once Soldiers possess the necessary conditioning to operate in these 
environs, they will still need further skills.  Soldiers must be experts at land 
navigation, both with and without GPS systems. 59  Too many Soldiers today rely 
on their Garmins and patrol looking down and following the pointer on the screen.  
The basics of land navigation—dead reckoning and terrain association, taught 
during training such as Expert Infantryman Badge lanes need to be reinforced 
and sustained so that Soldiers will be able to properly navigate and maintain 
situational awareness and appreciate the terrain and its effects on movement 
when the batteries inevitably fail.  
Operations on the terrain in Afghanistan—rough or nonexistent roads, 
inaccessible objectives, and the ever-present IED threat—place a premium on air 
delivery operations: airmobile, air drop, and air assault.  A majority of Soldiers, 
both those with a maneuver mission and those who work full-time on forward 
operating bases, will at some point be involved with aviation operations.  
Whether it is movement of forces or receiving resupply, Soldiers will find 
themselves working with aircraft.  Deployed units indicate that having Soldiers 
Pathfinder- and Air Assault-trained contributed immeasurably to conducting 
myriad missions. 
3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division emphasized the need for Pathfinders:  
“The establishment of drop zones for critical re-supply was routinely performed in 
Afghanistan. Insufficient numbers of soldiers were trained in the identification, 
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all soldiers in the Supply sections of Companies/Troops, and all soldiers in the S-
4 section of the battalions/squadrons, should receive Pathfinder training previous 
to deployment to Afghanistan.”60 
Multiple units frequently used sling loads to move equipment and material 
to provide critical resupply.  “The use of RW LZs was critical to performing 
resupply during COIN operations in rugged and remote terrain. Insufficient 
numbers of soldiers were trained in sling loading, and the identification, marking 
and operation or RW LZs.”61  COL Spiszer, a brigade commander, wrote,  
We were able to pick virtually all of the 101st Air Assault and 
Pathfinder slots as the rest of their brigades all deployed between 
February and May of 2008. We still weren’t that good at it. We did a 
lot in addition to a lot of training. It is just very air centric. It is very 
important to train with the aviation task force coming here in order 
to become a true air assault brigade.62 
Similar to air movement and mentioned previously, nearly every Soldier in 
Afghanistan can expect to conduct some sort of mounted vehicular movement.  
The current fleet of M1114s and M1151s, and the newer MATVs—while 
providing decent to above-average protection from small arms fire and IEDs, 
require tremendous amounts of operator-level maintenance to sustain operations 
in Afghanistan’s slow- and no-go traffic areas.  Every Soldier who performs 
missions with vehicles needs to be able to conduct PMCS, change tires, and 
tighten, or in the event of breakage, replace half-shafts. 63  Failure to ensure all 
Solders can perform these tasks will result in stranded crews when a vehicle 
breaks and the mechanics are not present. 
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Afghanistan’s mountain passes with small shoulders and at times near 
vertical drop-offs, and unstable roads greatly increase the probability of rollover 
accidents.  The two greatest sources of noncombat injuries are driving-related 
and negligent discharges. 64  Previously, some units were able to conduct drivers 
training in uparmored vehicles for the first time when they arrived in-theater.  
Fortunately, almost every installation today maintains a vehicle fleet for units to 
use for drivers’ training.  Soldiers need to be able to drive uparmored vehicles in 
rough terrain, and navigate while mounted using FBCB2, maps, and GPS. 
Due to inconsistent vehicle manning, caused by personnel on leave, 
injured, or the need to increase the Soldiers travelling in vehicles for later 
dismounted operations, units should strive to train as many Soldiers as possible 
to safely drive uparmored vehicles while at homestation, particularly the new 
MATV which some units have yet to see or touch. 65  Cross-training all crew 
members to either drive or operate the key weapon system is essential to 
ensuring continuity of operations in the event a driver or gunner is incapacitated 
during enemy contact.  Not only should all crewmembers be able to operate the 
vehicle and weapon system, but they should also all be able to locate their 
position with, and transmit messages with the Force XXI Battle Command 
Brigade and Below (FBCB2) terminal in each truck.  Although most units possess 
these platforms at home station, most Soldiers put their hands on them for the 
first time when driving in Afghanistan.  These terminals offer the ability to 
leverage too much information for the Soldier to be neglected in training.  
Another necessary topic for discussion for forces in Afghanistan is 
MEDEVAC/CASEVAC.  The ability to properly stabilize wounded Soldiers and 
quickly evacuate them to higher medical care is extremely important, particularly 
in remote isolated theaters like Afghanistan.  With units conducting decentralized 
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operations and medical assets being dispersed to the maximum extent to support 
Soldiers across extended areas of operation, lifesaving and life sustaining skills 
are critical.  Every unit lists combat lifesaver, or whatever homegrown version 
particular to that unit of trauma-specific buddy aid as part of its essential skills or 
“Big 5” or “Big 6.”  There is no doubt that CLS-trained Soldiers in small units are 
saving lives. Every leader needs to ensure his/her unit provides CLS training for 
Soldiers, and the routine refresher training as well.  Small unit leaders are often 
the first to become a casualty; therefore, in addition to all Soldiers being experts 
in saving lives, every Soldier must be ready to take charge of a situation in order 
to continue the fight.66 
Of this specific requirement for Afghanistan’s dispersed nature, one 
commander wrote,  
Combat lifesaver and medical skills were by far the most important 
skill to affect our operations. The nature of our area of operation 
resulted in an increased length of time for aerial MEDEVAC 
response as well as limited ground MEDEVAC capability. The 
importance of first responders and combat lifesavers was 
paramount in extending the life of wounded Soldiers until they could 
be moved to a higher level of care.67   
To augment the assigned medics, units indicated trying to send as many Soldiers 
as possible to further advanced medical training such as EMT or First Responder 
courses.68 
In addition to medical resources being stretched across the theater, 
Afghanistan’s rough terrain and IED threat further necessitates the need for 
facility in aeromedical evacuation.  In their AAR, 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain said 
that aeromedical evacuation was the only available means for evacuating 
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patients.  The mountainous terrain presented the greatest challenge to units 
while conducting medical evacuations, and the hoist evacuation method made up 
over 80% of the BCT’s evacuations.  They recommended training non-standard 
evacuation training methods prior to deployment.69 
3. Communicate 
Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan need to be able to communicate with 
the Afghan populace, and with other U.S. forces.  Discussion of communication 
will focus on individual Soldier communication skills and the training necessary to 
employ the myriad communication equipment in use today. 
Because language is perishable, and proficiency requires extensive effort, 
United States Forces-Afghanistan recommended that units destined for 
Afghanistan should begin language training early in their predeployment process. 
Commanders should routinely exercise all unit members in basic conversational 
Dari or Pashto language.70  The challenge to excuse Soldiers from other training 
long enough to make sufficient commitment to language training will always exist.  
About both cultural and language pre-deployment training, in their published 
lessons learned, the 10th Mountain Division wrote,  
Language is to culture as culture is to language—they’re 
synonymous. It is no longer sufficient for limited numbers of 
Soldiers in specialized skill sets and units to possess these 
capabilities. To enable the Army to operate in today's complex 
environments, Soldiers at all levels must possess some cultural 
awareness and foreign language capability.  Regrettably, Soldiers 
do not perceive the same focus on language.   
 
69 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
Impressions Report, 106–107. 
70 United States Forces – Afghanistan, Training Improvement Recommendations for US 
Forces Deploying to Afghanistan, 3. 
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One E5 infantryman said that if language were so important, 
 …Rosetta Stone programs would be incorporated in such a way 
that Soldiers were [would be]  rewarded by completing at their own 
pace, either by money, like language skill pay, or at a minimum 
promotion points, we would be a more effective sustaining force.71  
Foreign language capability extends beyond linguists, intelligence 
analysts, and interrogators to every Soldier and leader; it is an integral part of 
fostering a cultural awareness capability.”72  An E5 mortarman from another unit 
put it more succinctly,  
Soldiers need to understand, I mean really understand, that the 
only way we the U.S. can leave is to make ‘Friends.’  Many 
Afghans are corrupt, and as a people they may not deserve it, but 
we must ‘win’ over their support at every single opportunity.  Act as 
a parent to a child, and be good to them, so we can just leave.  Be 
good, until it’s time to not be good, then show them proper 
discipline.73 
The 10th Mountain Division recommended increase cultural training using 
situational training exercises (STX). The goal of the training is to develop the 
interpersonal skills required to develop trust in indigenous people so that they will 
share human intelligence (HUMINT) with coalition forces. 74 
In addition to interpersonal communication, Soldiers must possess the 
technical skills to operate numerous tactical communication systems.  From 
personal radios to TOC equipment, Afghanistan’s dispersed battlefield requires 
Soldiers to send and receive large volumes of information quickly, accurately, 
and efficiently.  Soldiers communicate on the battlefield using both FM and 
satellite communications, and they need to train on every piece of 
 
71 Anonymous quote to author collected during surveys. 
72 10th Mountain Division, CJTF-76 Lessons Learned, 35. 
73 Anonymous quote to author collected during surveys. 
74 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
Impressions Report, 24. 
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communications equipment that they will use in theater.75  To operate the 
various radio systems, Soldiers need to perform basic operations on 
communications equipment such as loading a frequency, verifying time, and 
loading crypto. 76  Just as all Soldiers need to be ready to man key weapon 
systems, they need to be prepared to operate communication systems.  When 
describing how he would prepare a unit for deploying in terms of Shoot, Move, 
and Communicate, an ordnance company commander commented that, 
“Communicate is Company 100% trained on FM platforms (ASIP, Thales, 
Harris), VIC3 system, TACSAT, FBCB2, SAT phone, and knowing the limitations 
for each and intero
Only slightly less important than being able to communicate with other 
Soldiers is being able to listen to enemy communications.  In the 10th Mountain 
Division, units made extensive use of FM scanners to eavesdrop on the enemy. 
Initially, units did not fully appreciate the importance of ICOM scanners as a 
SIGINT collection tool because prior to deployment they did not have an 
opportunity to conduct training on these collection systems. The enemy uses the 
ICOM radio as a primary means of communication, and scanners provided early 
warning, composition, disposition, and other forms of intelligence on insurgents in 
the area.78 
Voice communication is only one means for Soldiers to communicate.  
Tactical information is passed using numerous digital means, and Soldiers need 
to train on these systems prior to deployment so that they can become proficient 
in their operation during TOC operations and fully exploit their capabilities.  
Programs such as Internet Relay Chat for Windows (mIRC), High Performance 
 
75 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Afghan Commander AAR Book (OEF-
7), 26. 
76 United States Forces – Afghanistan, Training Improvement Recommendations for US 
Forces Deploying to Afghanistan, 7. 
77 TF Currahee, Afghan Commander AAR Book, 58. 
78 10th Mountain Division, CJTF-76 Lessons Learned, 171. 
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Waveform (HPW), or Tactical Chat (TAC Chat) should be included in MRE/MRXs 
in the same manner they will be utilized in the field, as well as Command Post of 
the Future (CPOF).79  In his Training Comments on Afghanistan, COL Spiszer 
commented on the importance of training MIRC chat:  
That is a big lack that you cannot train on them in the United States 
because it is not an authorized program on our networks. No unit 
can train before going to combat on MIRC chat. Yet, current 
operations happen from the platoon level up to CJTF level gets 
done on MIRC. All fire missions, all air space clearance, all current 
intelligence, everything goes on MIRC chat. You can’t even train on 
it. You go in the TOC and every screen has 10 or more MIRC chat 
windows open on it.80 
The Army’s Center for Lessons Learned indicates the importance of 
company-level command posts (CPs) and their command and control functions.  
Due to the terrain, extended distances, and decentralized nature of operations, 
company-level CPs are performing many functions previously done at the 
battalion-level.81   Intelligence transmission and receiving, coordinating fires, 
directing operations, and tracking of personnel require organized company CP 
functions, and all of these functions utilize the various communications systems 
previously mentioned.  Therefore, not only is it necessary to be able to physically 
operate the systems; CP personnel must also be able to employ them in concert 
with CP operations.       
Another function that company CPs are assuming that was previously 
done at the battalion level is intelligence.  With a limited number of intelligence 
analysts at the battalion level available to support dispersed company operations, 
a recent solution is the company intelligence cell, or company operations and 
intelligence support team.  Units assign intelligence analysts who previously 
 
79 United States Forces – Afghanistan, Training Improvement Recommendations for US 
Forces Deploying to Afghanistan, 8. 
80 Spiszer, Training Comments on Afghanistan. 
81 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan, 17. 
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resided on the battalion staff down to the company headquarters to work directly 
for the company commander.  Providing enhanced intelligence training on the 
utilization of intelligence assets and analysis to maneuver forces at the battalion 
level and below would help mitigate to some extent the current lack of necessary 
intelligence operations skills and personnel at the company level. 82 
C. GENERAL 
Some general comments on training made by Leaders and Soldiers 
deserve addressing in this section.  The comments speak to important training 
that does not fall in the categories of Shoot, Move, or Communicate, the scope of 
what can be trained, and the debate over opening lines of communication with 
the deployed unit. 
Addressed earlier, but worth reiterating, is equipping and training units 
realistically, so they can train like they will fight.  Leaders of combat support units 
emphasized the need to equip and train their units just like maneuver formations 
since their Soldiers worked in concert with maneuver forces.  TF120’s 
Comprehensive Lessons Learned White Paper indicated the need for support 
formations to train and deploy with equipment usually considered for maneuver 
formations such as crew served weapons, night vision devices, communication 
gear, optics, infrared aiming devices, and indirect fire capability.83  Another unit 
wrote in its lessons that integrated training between combat Soldiers and 
sustainment Soldiers established positive relationship and created 
opportunities.84  The 10th Mountain Division observed that currently, the forward 
support companies (FSCs) find themselves doing non–standard operations 
alongside Scouts and Infantrymen, and therefore “…should be equipped with the 
 
82 10th Mountain Division, CJTF-76 Lessons Learned, 29. 
83 TF 120, Comprehensive Lessons Learned White Paper Army Capabilities Integration 
Center, 9 June 2009), 6. 
84 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
Impressions Report, 64. 
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weapon systems, sights, communications equipment and night vision equipment 
to be successful on today’s battlefield.”85  After taking command of a company 
that had not trained on a lot of equipment that it was expected to employ during 
missions, a Sapper commander wrote that, “By finding out what is actually 
happening forward, and getting everyone on the same common operating 
picture, a unit can better plan and resource training early, thereby better 
preparing for combat operations during their deployment.”86  The value of 
communication with other units is undeniable. 
Not only is training with the right equipment essential, but integrating the 
right players on the team before deployment ensures proper integration in 
theater.87  Units should make every effort to train with specialty teams from Civil 
Affairs, Tactical HUMINT Teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and Special 
Forces Operational Detachments so that misunderstandings of roles and 
capabilities do not create resentment and exclusion of these substantial force 
multipliers later.  One commander wrote, “The key is to conduct demanding 
battle-focused training together. Development of this confident team will ensure 
that they will function properly “where the metal meets the meat.”88  At the very 
least, scheduling face-to-face briefings and meetings among Leaders will 
enhance synergy and cooperation even though dedicated field training time may 
not be possible due to conflicting schedules.  
An observation made by the 10th Mountain Division is that unmanned 
aerial vehicle (UAV) operators require extensive training time to effectively use 
these assets in theater. 89  Untrained operators will not operate these systems to 
their full capability, and commanders will then begin to discount the contribution 
 
85 10th Mountain Division, CJTF-76 Lessons Learned, 213. 
86 TF Currahee, Afghan Commander AAR Book, 47. 
87 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
Impressions Report, 19–20. 
88 Clark, Train for the Fight, 2. 
89 10th Mountain Division, CJTF-76 Lessons Learned, 38. 
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that UAVs can make to operations.  A remedy for this is substantial 
predeployment training on the systems while at home station, and staffs must 
coordinate the use of airspace to facilitate this training. 
Many units do not train on money-related tasks prior to deploying, but later 
find them mission critical and therefore have to lose Soldiers for some period to 
receive required training.  Fortunately, there are now more hubs in Afghanistan 
where Soldiers can receive financial training, draw monies, and maintain 
accounts.  However, the requirement to coordinate and secure transportation—
which is always subject to weather and higher priority mission requirements—will 
always have an effect on how long a Soldier is off the line and away somewhere 
awaiting training.90   
Whether it be ordering officers, pay agents, solatia payments for 
consequence management, small rewards programs, or Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, lack of use, or mismanagement of 
these programs can both cripple a mission as well as create severe legal 
problems for units.91  A large obstacle to conducting this training during 
predeployment trainup is determining the current theater-specific requirements 
and receiving valid and relevant certification.  Often, units must wait until they 
arrive in theater to schedule this training, but by then, are too busy to spare 
adequate numbers of Soldiers to train primary and backup personnel.        
Between and among units interviewed for this thesis, there was 
disagreement over the utility of contacting the counterpart unit being relieved in 
place.  Within the literature there was the same varying of focus on downrange 
feedback.  Some leaders felt that the members of their unit should only focus on 
executing guidance originating from the chain of command, while other leaders 
 
90 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Operation Enduring Freedom Initial 
Impressions Report, 30. 
91 10th Mountain Division, CJTF-76 Lessons Learned, 204–205. 
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encouraged, and they themselves made numerous efforts to, contact their 
deployed counterparts to gain information with which to modify their training. 
When, during a past deployment, the author of this thesis requested from 
a staff major in his unit a point of contact from the incoming unit that would be 
replacing him so that he could start copying him daily reports and statuses, the 
major replied that all information would go through him and that he “… would 
take care of it.”  Later during relief in place operations, when the author spoke 
with his newly arrived counterpart, he found that he was answering many 
questions about information that he had previously collated and forwarded to his 
staff.  When asked if he had received any of this information, the new 
commander replied that he had not.  Months later in an interview with 60 
Minutes, one junior leader from the newly arrived unit commented, "I thought it 
was gonna be a little bit quieter here. But we landed in a hornet's nest when we 
got here."  When asked by the interviewer if he thought he would be landing in a 
hornet’s nest, the same leader replied, "No.  Not at all.  I guess I really didn't 
know what to expect when I got here. I'd never been here before…”92  Watching 
this after redeploying home, this greatly frustrated this thesis’ author.  
Somewhere, the staffs failed.  Information describing the enemy’s patterns and 
locations of the ambushes and engagement areas in which this unit suffered 
casualties shown on the 60 Minutes news clip had previously been transmitted.  
Unfortunately, someone decided for whatever reason to hoard the information.  
Sharing that information may have prevented a casualty.  
The potential conflict over whose commander’s intent a leader may be 
executing is a valid concern; however, one would think that excluding input from 
a deployed unit risks ignoring timely and relevant updates to the commander’s 
initial framing and conceptualizing of the problem.  While on one hand it is 
 
92 Combat in Afghanistan – "Fighting in a Hornet's Nest," directed by Peter Klein and Jeff 
Newton CBS News (60 Minutes), 2008), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5291120n&tag=related;photovideo (accessed 9 
February 2010) 
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possible that the higher commander and his/her staff have adequate dialogue 
with their deployed counterparts with which to inform his/her own command 
training guidance, it is also feasible that there may be some holes in that 
knowledge.  What the higher commander or staff might feel not to be important 
enough, or have enough time to focus on and relay, the subordinate may in fact 
find critical later.  Information-sharing structures should be flat, not hierarchical.  
While staffs are useful for delineating tasks, they are not good for information 
flow.  Too much is hoarded—either accidentally or by design.  If it is expected 
that Leaders should be taking the time to read all the available published material 
on their mission or area of operation, why not the same emphasis on opening 
lines of communication with deployed counterparts to establish a near real-time 
flow of information?   
This also begs the question, however, of whether or not Leaders are 
“doing their homework” and consulting the vast body of knowledge that already 
exists.  The Army’s CALL, among numerous other forums such as 
Smallwarsjournal.com or the Combat Studies Institute, are good places to start 
research before a deployment.  When interviewed about what CALL products he 
read in preparation for deployment, one battalion S3 said, “There are more 
products available than we can read. I do not think there is anything missing after 
using CALL products for four deployments so far.”93   
Individual access login data that this author obtained from the Army CALL 
Web site’s webmasters indicated trends by rank (see Table 1).  The data 
obtained covered the period from February 2007 until May 2010.  To discern 
trends among personnel in the Army accessing the CALL Web site, the author 
first went through the spreadsheets—which contained on average 60,000 
individual logins per year—and deleted multiple logins by the same individual in 
any one day.  To establish a baseline, credit was only given for an individual of a 
 
93 MAJ Tommy L. Cardone, Interview MAJ Cardone, ed. Center for Army Lessons Learned 
(FT Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 12 June 2009), 4. 
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certain grade to have accessed the Web site once in a month.  Therefore, a 
major, while he may have accessed CALL 30 times in January, and only once in 
February through December, is recorded as having accessed CALL 12 times.  
The data indicates that officers in the ranks of major and captain are third 
and fourth, respectively, in accessing the Web site.  The highest amounts of 
logins were by the aggregate of junior enlisted from private through staff 
sergeant.  Most interestingly, sergeants first class exceeded any other rank in the 
Army for accessing the CALL Web site.  Of note, there is no way to determine 
what specific material individuals accessed, but for the purpose of this 
discussion, the author is making the assumption that a Soldier or Leader 
accessing the Center for Army Lessons Learned is seeking something 
deployment-related.94   
An interesting trend is that of CALL access by lieutenants.  Given that a 
majority of lieutenants coming out of a college commissioning source possesses 
better than average computer skills, and that second and first lieutenant 
comprise a major portion of the officer population, one might expect to see more 
lieutenants accessing CALL.     
 
94 Clayton Robertson, CALL Web site Access Data, 2010 (accessed 15 May 2010). 
 Figure 6. ARMY CALL Access Data Feb07-May10 
At the time of this writing, data from the Army, listing how many Leaders 
(officers and enlisted) by grade were serving in the Army during this timeframe, is 
unavailable.  Were it possible to isolate the results to Leaders that were 
deploying or had deployed, comparison of the table above with the total 
population would reveal interesting results regarding what percentage of Leaders 
from the Army at-large are “doing their homework.”  
On the topic of using input from deployed units, in an email to the author, 
COL Spiszer, commander of 3-1 IBCT, commented on the importance of the Pre-
Deployment Site Surveys (PDSS) with the unit he was replacing and the effects 
they had on his training guidance: “We put a great deal of effort into contacting 
our counterpart units in Afghanistan.  We were fortunate enough in being able to 
conduct 3 PDSS. … These allowed us to gain the contact we needed at most 
levels to coordinate what we needed to train, equipment to deploy with, etc.  
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Generally speaking, however, we did a great job gathering information from Dec 
2007 on that definitely shaped our training plan, our NTC rotation, etc.” 95   
CALL’s The First 100 Days further emphasizes the need to at the very 
least maintain situational awareness and not develop tunnel vision by rigidly 
adhering to an approved training plan.  Whether units modify plans based upon 
reading lessons learned from other units, or establish direct contact to gain 
situational awareness, the intent is to ensure that predeployment training is up to 
date.  As the situation and enemy techniques change, small units must adapt 
tactics and procedures to ensure realistic training. 96   
Therein lies the question: Why are some unit Leaders resistant to 
incorporate advice from a unit it is replacing or that it’s in contact with, whereas it 
is completely acceptable to highlight a published learned lesson?  In his notes on 
preparing his BCT, COL Spiszer demonstrated the willingness to deviate from his 
original training guidance so that his training remained relevant: “The ‘Training 
Guidance’ was important, but not overly so.  We ensured we did the tasks 
required, but tempered and prioritized that based on what we learned during 
PDSS and what tasks we had to accomplish to build a unit from scratch.  Thus, 
many of those tasks that were not readily or obviously required for our 
deployment we just familiarized (NBC).  Others we spent large amounts of time 
on (CLS).”97  Another unit described how they integrated and updated both 
previous experience and doctrine for deployment to Afghanistan: “We used 
lessons from the battalion’s last Operation Iraqi Freedom deployment, our Army’s  
 
 
95 John M. COL Spiszer, 3-1ID Afghanistan Prep Training Lessons, 5 January 2010, 2010 
(accessed 5 January 2010). 
96 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The First 100 Days – Operation Enduring Freedom 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 25. 
97 Spiszer, 3-1ID Afghanistan Prep Training Lessons. 
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current doctrine, and keys tasks from the unit being relieved in place.”98  A 1SG 
described how he gleaned information to be able to employ his battery in a new 
fashion,  
We searched lessons learned from the 82nd and 101st Airborne 
Divisions, and the 10th Mountain Division and Ranger Regiments. 
We planned to implement the lessons learned from these great 
units into our battery, most importantly deploying with the ability to 
conduct split-battery operations.99 
All of these leaders were able to create realistic training for their Soldiers 
because they were able to set aside individual biases and organizational culture.  
In some cases, however, pride prevents this from occurring.  Although previous 
deployment experience of Soldiers is invaluable, the one attitude that Leaders 
need to be aware of is one the sometimes develops of those who remain in the 
same unit for multiple deployments.  Describing interaction with the unit replacing 
him, one brigade commander commented,  
We had a great relationship with our replacements, but there was 
some of that “we know what we are doing, we have done this a 
couple of times in Iraq” attitude.  I think the attitude is unit-based 
and mostly centered around the 40% or so of a unit that stays with 
it and comes for the next deployment.   
Leaders need to ensure that their Soldiers, and they themselves, do not 
become wedded to only one solution or approach to problems.  Regardless, it is 
a two-way street: new units need to be willing to listen, and outgoing units need 
to make every effort during relief in place operations to not become complacent 
and stay focused on passing on everything they learned to their replacements.    
 
98 LTC Ronald E. Zimmerman, CPT Caitlin M. Dempsey and 1LT Haley E. Whitfield, 
"Lessons Learned from the Front – Operation Enduring Freedom," Engineer, January–April 
(2009), 55, http://call.army.mil (accessed 3 August 2009). 
99 US Army Sergeants Major Academy, Long Hard Road: NCO Experiences in Afghanistan 
and Iraq (FT Bliss, TX: US Army Sergeants Major Academy, October 2007), 62. 
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IV. THE ART OF TRAINING 
What you do for your Soldiers in predeployment training is the most 
important factor in increasing their ability to survive in combat.100 
      -CALL OEF First 100 Days 
Analysis of doctrine revealed scant reference to proper pre-deployment 
training, and the collection of empirical reports, AARs, monographs, and letters 
only occasionally addressed the specific influences that caused Leaders to select 
specific tasks to train.  A survey conducted of four light infantry brigade combat 
teams (BCTs) revealed the degree to which certain factors influenced selection 
of training tasks.  The intent of the survey was to question the Leaders (planners) 
about what influenced their decisions to design training plans and to gauge the 
effectiveness of those decisions by polling the Soldiers (executers) about how 
prepared they felt to execute their missions while deployed.   
 Due to the time available to research and write this thesis—approximately 
a year, a large shortcoming of this study was that it was impossible to get a 
definitively representative example of Army training by tracking multiple units 
across the entire ARFORGEN process—from RESET through pre-deployment 
training through deployment.  No single unit deployment timeline fell within this 
window. As a result, the survey subjects included three BCTs that had completed 
pre-deployment training and were within one month of deploying, and one BCT 
that had just recently redeployed.  There is no data available for a unit from pre-
deployment training through deployment.   
 However, despite the high tempo of operations—both for the units 
preparing to deploy and recovering, and the resulting competing demands for 
Soldiers’ and Leaders’ time—all four BCTs wholly supported the author’s 
 
100 Center for Army Lessons Learned, The First 100 Days – Operation Enduring Freedom 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 25. 
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research efforts by making large amounts of Soldiers available for surveying.  As 
discussed previously in this thesis, maneuver missions are no longer the sole 
domain of combat arms units.  Therefore, the target population for research 
included any type of unit that would conduct a maneuver mission.  As a result, 
the survey subjects were infantrymen, artillerymen, engineers, cavalrymen, 
military police, logisticians, truck drivers, signal, and military intelligence.  Eighty-
four Leaders from platoon sergeant to battalion operations officers, and seventy-
eight subordinates from private first class to first lieutenant completed the survey.  
In addition, three of the brigade operations officers and one brigade commander 
personally discussed their units’ training with the author.  This research would not 
have been possible had it not been for the outstanding support afforded by the 
commanders of these units.     
 Subjects answered one of two surveys.  The first survey was for Leaders, 
and it examined what influences caused them to prioritize some training tasks 
over others.  The focus was pre-deployment training plans.  The survey queried 
the subjects across 64 individual Soldier tasks.  The complete list of Soldier tasks 
numbers anywhere from 80 to over 100, depending on to what level of granularity 
one chooses to decompose the tasks.  For example, the task conduct “Combat 
Lifesaver Training” consists of approximately 11 tasks, again depending on how 
much one aggregates or decomposes the individual tasks.  Based upon 
feedback from trial tests of the survey, to prevent monotony and possible loss of 
fidelity of the subjects’ responses due to survey fatigue, the author aggregated 
certain tasks under one heading.  For example, the author grouped all of the First 
Aid tasks under the overarching task of “Conduct Combat Lifesaver Training.”  
The survey questioned what influences caused the Leader to include, not 
include, add, or delete an individual task from the training plan.  Additionally, the 
survey asked the Leader to rate the overall effectiveness of the training plan, 
given all of the influences that may or may not have caused him/her to modify 
their plan. 
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 The second survey was for subordinates.  Using the same list of tasks as 
the Leaders’ survey, it simply asked the subordinate to indicate how comfortable 
or prepared the Soldier felt executing each task while deployed.  The focus here 
was the effectiveness of the Leader’s plan.  The intent was to rate how effective 
his/her training was for each task.  The original intent was to use this survey as a 
control group for the corresponding Leader’s survey in that unit.  A strong 
possibility for bias existed when asking Leaders to rate their training plan.  Most 
likely, a leader would tend to rate his/her plan as being very effective.  If, instead, 
from the perspective of the subordinates the effects (resulting proficiency) of 
each Leader’s plan were possible to collect, this would provide a more unbiased 
assessment of that plan’s effectiveness.  However, due to the limitations of 
available redeployed units, data collection from only one population of deployed 
subordinates was possible.       
A. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The author developed the pre-deployment survey questions based upon 
his prior experience with competing demands in the contemporary operating 
environment to prove or disprove his hypotheses about the main factors 
influencing training.  The survey instrument asked five questions about each 
possible training task in the training plan.  It was a hybrid of multiple-choice 
questions to select for the presence of certain influences on the choices to 
include, exclude, or adjust priorities of tasks, and also used a five point Likert-
type scale ranging from Not Adequate to Very Adequate, asking each subject to 
rate their training conducted for each task.101   
The subjects answered these questions for each of the 64 tasks.  See 
Figure 7 and Appendix 1.  
 
101 Survey developed with the assistance of Prof. Doowan Lee and Prof. Ronald Fricker, 
Naval Postgraduate School.  Prof. Lee provided guidance on the initial formulation of surveys 
during his SO4450 “Analytical Methods” class, and during office hours with the author.  Prof. 
Fricker used his experience conducting surveys to design the survey with the author, and later 
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Figure 7. PRE-DEPLOYMENT LEADER SURVEY  
Attempting to gain some parallel correlation, the author administered the 
same pre-deployment survey questions, asking why Leaders chose certain tasks 
for redeployed Leaders.  Analysis of responses from the subordinates of these 
Leaders provided a control.   
The second survey was for post-deployment subordinates.  It was also a 
hybrid questionnaire that gauged the efficiency as well as the effectiveness of the 
training they received.  Two questions sought to determine if Leaders wisely 
included or excluded tasks, and one question was a Likert-type scale asking the 
subordinates to rate the effectiveness of their training.   
The subordinates answered these questions for the same range of training 
tasks as that answered by the Leaders.102  See Figure 8 and Appendix 2. 
 
                                            




















































Figure 8. POST-DEPLOYMENT SUBORDINATE SURVEY 
The intent of the pre-deployment survey was to determine if environmental 
factors influenced Leaders’ decisions to include tasks in their training plans.  The 
author sought to include as many possible potential influences affecting today’s 
Leaders.  Though secondary to the control rating of the subordinate Soldiers, by 
having the Leaders also rate the effectiveness of their own training, the author 
wanted to know from the perspective of the Leaders if environmental factors did 
or did not affect training. 
The dependent variable for the pre-deployment survey was effective 
training.  To confirm the hypotheses introduced in the first chapter, the pre-
deployment survey grouped influences into five categories that causes tasks to 
be: Not Included, Included, having Modified Effort, Added, and Deleted.  These 
five categories were the independent variables.  See Figure 7. 
For the post-deployment survey, the dependent variable was also 
effectiveness of training.  However, as this was a control for the pre-deployment 
survey, there were no causal mechanisms to test.   
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1. Pre-Deployment Survey Results 
Even though the survey questioned subjects on the presence of bias 
caused by five different factors, due to the erratic and incomplete answers from 
many of the subjects for Added and Deleted influences—most likely due to 
survey fatigue at that point—the most credible data came from answers 
pertaining to tasks being Not Included, Included, and having Modified Effort.  
Skew analysis of these independent variables indicates the presence of different 
degrees of bias, and the greater the skew, the more each respondent is biased 
by particular training influences.  Skew analysis of these grouped independent 
variables revealed that when tasks were Not Included had the most substantial 
impact on effective training (see Table 1).103   
The coefficient for Not Included was -13.7, while Included and Modified 






Not Included  ‐13.776  3.84  ‐3.59  0.001 
Included  ‐3.355  3.545  ‐0.95  0.348 
Modified Effort  ‐2.89  4.105  ‐0.7  0.485 
Table 1.   STATA SKEW ANALYSIS104 
The high coefficient for Not Included indicates the presence of bias, while 
including tasks and Modifying Effort for them displays moderate bias.105   
                                            
103 Edward R. Tufte, Data Analysis for Politics and Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1974), 110. 
104 Prof. Doowan Lee from the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate 
School assisted the author by developing the analysis and interpretation of the survey data. 
105 Prof. Doowan Lee at the Naval Postgraduate School assisted the author in interpreting 
these results by presenting the effects of bias discovered descriptive statistical analysis of the 
results. 
A graphical representation of the bias present in why units are not 
including tasks, and the specific reasons is seen in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. WHY TASKS ARE NOT PART OF TRAINING PLANS 
The influences polled for in this category are the high cost of resources to 
execute training, communications with the deployed unit, researched trends in 
the units area of operations, and limitations of time.  Statistically, as well as 
graphically, one can see what biases exist when tasks are excluded from training 
plans. 
Bias is present in including tasks and modifying effort, though to a lesser 
degree than that when tasks are not included.   
Graphically, the reasons for tasks being included and having modified 
effort are in Figures 10 and 11. 
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 Figure 10. WHY TASKS ARE PART OF TRAINING PLANS 
Commanders’ intent and past experience of the subjects are the dominant 
reasons why Leaders select tasks for training their subordinates.  This is 
consistent with all of the published literature—that Leaders tend to relate 
upcoming deployments to previous deployments.  As one would expect, of 
course the commander’s guidance and intent are the primary factors that 
influence training.  This is not inherently risky, if one assumes that commanders 
have perfect knowledge, and are therefore able to accurately forecast what 
training a unit needs.  It is when a commander’s intent far outweighs any other 
influence, and thus restricts other factors from influencing training, that biased 
training occurs.  To lesser degrees, the other reasons for including certain tasks 
in training plans are influence of trends in the operational environment, ease of 
resourcing for this training, and published lessons learned. 
Not surprisingly, Resources and Time—both limiting factors in any training 
environment—account for the two greatest reasons why units adjust their 
prioritization of training tasks (Figure 11).  
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 Figure 11. WHY UNITS ADJUST PRIORITIZATION 
Other influences polled for in this study were: communications with the 
deployed unit, trends in the operational environment, and guidance from the 
subjects’ commanders.   
Both of these figures—reasons for including tasks, and adjusting their 
priorities, indicate that there is some bias in these decisions, and their 
coefficients from skew analysis confirm this bias.  
The smaller the p-values, the more statistically significant the independent 
variables.  The low p-values listed in Table 1 indicate that there is a strong 
relationship between effective execution of training and low bias, particularly for 
tasks not included (p=.001).  On the other hand, the large coefficients indicate 
greater substantive significance of the independent variables.  The impact of the 
bias measured from the topics not included had the most substantive impact and 
the highest degree of statistical significance. In other words, this type of bias was 





independent variables—Tasks Included and Modified Effort—both display similar 
statistical and substantive significance, though less than that of Tasks Not 
Included.106   
The data listed in Table 2 indicates that the independent variables—not 
included, included, and modified effort—exhibit only small degrees of statistical 
correlation. This indicates that the estimates from the model do not suffer from 
colinearity or variance inflation.107  If these values were higher, only a 
combination of two or more of these independent variables produce biases in 
training.   
  Not Included Included Modified Effort 
Not Included  1     
Included  0.156  1   
Modified Effort  0.13  0.247  1 
Table 2.   STATA STATISTICAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS108 
2. Post-Deployment Survey Results 
Because the post-deployment survey for subordinates did not include any 
causal mechanisms, and instead was a subjective rating of their training, this 
survey provides the qualitative aspect of the training conducted to prepare for 
deployment. 
For the 63 tasks polled, given that the subjects trained a task and later 
executed it, they had the option of rating their training’s effectiveness of each 
from one to five, indicating that they did not train for it and did not execute it, or 
                                            
106 Prof. Doowan Lee explained to the author how to use the descriptive statistics analysis to 
interpret the survey data. 
107 Harvey Dr Motulsky, "Multicollinearity in Multiple Regression," 
http://www.graphpad.com/articles/Multicollinearity.htm (accessed 31 May 2010). 
108 Prof. Doowan Lee provided these STATA statistical correlation analysis results. 
indicating that they trained for it but did not execute it.  If a Soldier did not train for 
a task and did not execute it, for the purpose of this thesis the author is assuming 
that the Leader made an efficient decision with training time.  If instead a Soldier 
indicates training a task but not executing, the author is making a very broad 
assumption that this was an inefficient use of time.  Of note, this is not to 
characterize the Leader’s decisions; in a perfect world, every Soldier would train 
First Aid tasks but not use them.  The intent of this analysis is to make some 
generalizations about use of time that one may possibly correlate back to 
influences on Leaders’ decisions. 
Before one can examine the normalized effectiveness of the 78 
subordinates’ responses, one must examine how many Soldiers indicated that 














Table 3.   EFFICIENT EXCLUSION OF TRAINING TASKS 
Table 3 indicates that on average, of the 63 tasks, Soldiers did not train 
and did not execute 8.7.  However, both the standard deviation and variance of 
these 78 responses were very large. 
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Table 4 indicates that on average, Soldiers trained 11.8 tasks of the 63 
possible, but did not later execute this task while deployed.  Making the broad 
assumption that this was the result of poor planning by Leaders would be 
incorrect.  However, the intent of this question was to determine if in general 
Soldiers were training for the proper tasks.  Similar to the previous metric, there 
is a large standard deviation and variance in the Soldiers’ responses.  This is 













Table 4.   POSSIBLE INEFFICIENT TRAINING WITH CAVEAT 
These two tables offer some insight into making initial assumptions about 
the possible efficiency and inefficiency of Leaders when designing training.  
Every Leader strives to conduct streamlined, focused, and relevant training.  
However, Soldiers may or may not experience numerous events in the 
operational environment.  Regardless, these metrics are important for accounting 
for the large discrepancy in numbers later when analyzing the results of Soldiers 
rating their training.       
Taking into account the large variation in numbers of tasks Soldiers 
indicated not training for and not executing, and training for but not executing, 
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Table 5 indicates that on average, Soldiers rated their training of 47.7 tasks of 
the 71 possible.  This means that nearly a third of the possible tasks did not 











Count 78  
Table 5.   TASKS THAT SOLDIERS TRAINED AND EXECUTED 
To determine the Soldiers’ overall description of the effectiveness of 
training, normalization of the responses was necessary.  On a five-point scale, 
with one being “Not Effective,” and five being “Very Effective,” one through five 
were assigned values of negative two, negative one, zero, one, and two, 
respectively.  This established a common reference point for the responses—
higher positive values indicate more effective training, and lower negative values 
indicate ineffective training.  Using the average of 47.7 tasks rated for 
effectiveness by Soldiers, the normalized highest value one would expect is 95.4.  
One must not disregard the standard deviation for tasks the Soldiers trained and 
executed, for this standard deviation carries forward through all of the results.   
The descriptive statistics of the Normalized ratings of training 
effectiveness are surprising.  Using the averages previously mentioned, Soldiers 
rated their training on average at 26.1 out of 95.4 for effectiveness.  However, the 
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largest number of responses did generally group at more- to very-effective.  Yet, 
the standard deviation is very large, and so is the range.  Skewness and kurtosis 
are very small, so one could conclude that the results are generally evenly 











Maximum 110  
Table 6.   TRAINING EFFECTIVENESS (-56 LEAST, 166 MOST)  
Figure 12 provides a graphical representation of the total responses from 
all Soldiers across all tasks. 
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 Figure 12. SUBORDINATES’ ASSESSMENT OF THEIR TRAINING 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The statistical analysis of the 162 survey responses indicates that 
environmental factors do influence decisions made when making training plans.  
This is not a surprise; the degree to which the factors bias decisions, and the 
resulting impacts on perceived effectiveness of training is considerable.  If a 
Leader has perfect knowledge of the battlefield and was able to keep the myriad 
aspects affecting the relative merit of each training task organized then bias 
would not be an issue.  Unfortunately, any one Leader is unable to know 
everything and simultaneously balance all the influences to prevent bias.  The 
result is that many Leaders may become fixed along one line of thinking, or 
overly rely on a select few influences to guide decisions.  The survey responses 
are telling, and clearly show that not including tasks had the greatest effect on 




Properly excluding tasks could lead to more effective training since it 
allows for streamlining of effort and better allocation of scarce training time to 
more important tasks.  The assumptions, however, are that the remaining 
available training time is allocated to the correct tasks, and that the tasks are 
excluded for the right reasons.  The concern from the data in Figure 9 however is 
that some Leaders exclude tasks primarily because of time required and 
available resources.  In effect, these are forced decisions.  The majority of survey 
responses do not indicate that Leaders excluded tasks because of some 
feedback from deployed units or because operational trends dictated a prudent 
choice.  One should infer that the implicit risk is that a Leader may inadvertently 
exclude a mission essential task simply because of adequate resources.         
If it were possible to assist Leaders in gathering and implementing multiple 
influences and environmental factors, their decisions would be more uniform and 
possibly more effective.  Leaders would be free to focus more on the qualitative 
analysis of what is most important and constantly refine the framework of their 
units’ training.  The survey results do not indicate that Leaders are making 
ineffective decisions and that training is inadequate.  However, even though a 
majority of the subordinates rated their training as more- or very-effective, the 
number of subordinates’ responses cover the range of effectiveness—from not 
effective all the way to very effective—and do not exhibit large amounts of skew.  
Therefore, one can conclude that while there is not a perceived ineffectiveness of 
training, there is also not a definite majority of perceived effectiveness.  The goal 
is to conduct training that is primarily very effective instead of generally 
distributed across a qualitative scale.      
When the Leaders answered why they included tasks, or did not include 
them, or modified the effort for certain tasks, in general, trends in the area of 
operations and communications with the deployed unit did not factor in as the 
predominant reasons for these decisions.  One should wonder if heavily relying 
on the Commander’s intent, or the Leader’s past experience, is sufficient for 
tailoring homestation training to the operating environment.  If the Commander’s 
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visualization of the battlefield is mostly accurate, then that alone would be 
sufficient to shape training.  However, should he/she be incorrect, then the one 
influence could harmfully alter training.  If Leaders are striving to close the 
proficiency gap between their units and the units they will replace—and they 
should be, they should input multiple sources of information to make training 
relevant.  Just as doctrine needs tempering with practicality, subjective opinions 
need tempering with reality and current existing conditions.     
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V. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: DECISION SUPPORT TOOL 
To the extent that the factors of uncertainty and human judgment 
are significant, the accuracy of predictions is adversely 
influenced.109 
       - Ephraim Kam 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The decision support tool introduced in this chapter may be accessed by 
clicking the paper clip icon visible on the lower lefthand corner of your screen. 
You may need to save the Excel file to your hard drive in order to open it.  
To assist the commander or operations officer in allocating training time, 
the decision support tool uses a math model to provide an objective answer to a 
subjective question: how much to train a task?  The intent is not to be 
proscriptive; rather, it is to serve as a guide or suggestion for the planner.  The 
essence of the tool is to use historical frequencies as probabilities, combined with 
the commander’s preferences, and time factors for each task, to assist the 
planner in efficiently planning training for his/her unit.  Although the author at the 
Naval Postgraduate School designed the decision support tool, it is subjective to 
the user, who will assign characteristics and factors specific to his/her unit.  The 
results are objective—free from personal bias beyond initial inputs—and 
mathematically correct according to probability and optimization. 
The use of a mathematical model to assist decisionmaking in a dynamic 
setting like the contemporary operating environment—subject to numerous 
 
 
109 Ephraim Kam, "Judgmental Biases and Intelligence Analysis," in Surprise Attack: The 
Victim's Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 115, 
https://nps.blackboard.edu (accessed 11 May 2010). 
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influences and human variables—may at first seem unrealistic.  How is it 
possible to apply a hard science such as mathematics to such a vague situation 
like combat, or preparation for combat?  
The reason for using a mathematical model to assist in decisionmaking is 
applying probability.  In addition, use of the model provides a systematic method 
to account for and implement numerous influences that most people would be 
unable to keep organized across dozens of tasks.  The primary reason, however, 
is to use probability to assist in making choices.  For those dubious about using a 
math model to make training decisions, a vignette illustrating the utility of math, 
and in particular probability, is in order. 
The leaders of the Iranian hostage rescue in April 1980 aborted the 
mission after excessive aircraft loss, due to mechanical failure and accident 
jeopardizing the minimum rescue helicopter force size.  After analysis of the fleet 
RH-53D helicopter operational readiness data from the previous year and a half, 
the planners concluded that having eight helicopters would provide adequate 
redundancy to airlift the assault force.  The minimum number of aircraft required 
to complete the mission was six.  The planners made the decision to fly two 
spares after examining the maintenance records and guessing that two additional 
aircraft would be ample; they did not use any math.  Unfortunately, three out of 
the eight helicopters (37%) failed before reaching the refueling rendezvous point, 
dooming the mission even before the fatal collision of a helicopter and C130 
aircraft.110 
If, however, the planners had used a binomial probability distribution, with 
a 20% failure rate (gleaned from the year and a half of maintenance records), 
they would have known that they had only a 79% chance of six aircraft arriving at 
the refueling site if they launched eight.  Working backwards, if the planners 
 
110 Captain Wayne Hughes Jr, The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission (Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA: Department of Operations Research [1981]) (accessed 4 September 
2009). 
 81
                                           
insisted on a 95% probability that six aircraft with a 20% failure rate would arrive 
mission capable at the refueling site, the binomial distribution would have 
indicated that they should have launched 10 aircraft.111 
The point of this vignette is to illustrate the utility of using math, and in 
particular probability, to assist in decisionmaking.  Probability is not a guarantee, 
however.  Knowing the probability of an event and implementing it into a decision 
merely puts the odds in the decisionmaker’s favor.  A simple metaphor for the 
benefits of putting the odds in the decisionmaker’s favor is running a foot race.  
Assume that Runner “A” can run the 100-yard dash 10% faster than Runner “B.”  
In effect, Runner “A” is only running 90 yards.  Knowing this, if it were possible to 
make any change to keep the race fair, Runner “B” should start 10 yards ahead 
of Runner “A.”  Starting “A” behind “B” does not guarantee that “B” will beat “A;” 
“B”’s ability is still an unknown.  However, by using that known 10%, “B” can at 
least level the playing field and leverage the odds in his favor.112 
Leaders can use probability in a similar fashion to assist in deciding what 
tasks to train before deployment.  Using the frequency with which an event has 
occurred over a period of time, one can roughly approximate how likely it is to 
occur in the future, given that there are no drastic environmental changes.  For 
example, while flipping a coin and getting heads the first time does not indicate 
that the person will flip a heads the second or third time, over time and after 
sufficient trials, the person will be able to detect that he/she will flip heads 50% of 
the time.  Each trial of flipping a coin is mutually exclusive, and just because an 
event happens once does not mean that it will happen again.  This model uses 
the frequency with which events requiring use of certain training tasks occurred 
 
111 Ibid. 
112 The idea to include the Iran Hostage Rescue mission, and discussion of using probability 
in ones favor came from discussion with Prof. Gregory Mislick at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
During his SO3410 “Modeling for Special Operations II” class, Prof. Mislick introduced the 
concept of binomial distribution, and during subsequent instruction on probabilities, introduced the 
allegory of two runners to illustrate the benefits of using probability.  
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to approximate how likely a similar event will occur in the future.  This is not an 
exact prediction; yet, it is still useful in predicting trends. 
Additionally, use of a math model or program can allow implementation of 
numerous influences simultaneously and in a systematic manner instead of 
randomly or by chance.  The math model is a way to consistently organize the 
influences in decision making so that accidental omission or emphasis does not 
occur.  
B. MODEL THEORETICAL DESIGN 
Optimization assists with resource allocation decisions, and in the case of 
pre-deployment training the resource is time.  The math model for the Decision 
Support Tool sorts all of the decision variables and allocates time to each to 
optimize the utility of training.  Each of the training tasks selected by the user 
becomes decision variables in the objective function.  The constraint in the model 
is time available.  The profit coefficients for each of the decision variables are the 
subjective values the Leader assigned based upon the commander’s preference 
for the task and the historical frequency with which the task occurred in the unit’s 
operational area.  The user maximizes the utility of the objective function by 
allocating time to each of the training tasks in accordance with those having the 
greatest preference, historical frequency, and lowest cost in terms of time. 
“Learning curves” for each task assist with efficiently allocating time.  
These curves model two discrete points: the minimum time one must train a task 
to begin learning it, and the time at which any further time devoted to a task 
provides diminishing returns in gained proficiency.  For example, Soldiers can 
begin learning how to perform a task such as Perform CPR almost immediately, 
so therefore the minimum, or start learning time is zero.  On the other hand, a 
task such as Operate Counter Remote-controlled improvised explosive device 
Electronic Warfare (CREW) may require substantially more time before Soldiers 
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begin understanding the principles and operation, so therefore the minimum or 
start learning time could be two hours.  
Conversely, a Soldier may master Performing CPR after one and a half 
hours, and Operating CREW after five hours, so any further time devoted to 
these tasks would provide diminishing returns and would be better spent training 
other tasks.  Using these learning curves assists in developing constraints for the 
math model.  The tasks with the steepest slope formed by these two points get 
time allocated to them sooner to reach proficiency, because these are the tasks 
to which any time allocated provides the greatest returns in terms of learned 
ability.  So that the model returns results tailored to the Leader’s preferences, the 
user can modify the curves based upon knowledge of their unit and provide the 
math model a set of constraints that prevent allocating too little or too much time 
to each task.113 
The program is simple; it sorts the tasks and the background code 
allocates time in accordance with the priorities listed above.  During the first run 
through the tasks chosen by the Leader, the model allocates each task enough 
time to reach the point at which Soldiers start to learn the task.  During the 
second run the program then sorts the chosen tasks by the product of Priority 
and Frequency, and allocates enough time to each to reach proficiency, as 
defined by the learning curve for that task.  The user has the option to change 
the weighting exponent for priority so that priority has more or less effect than 
frequency during allocation of time to reach proficiency.  This is useful in cases 
where there may not be sufficient time to train all tasks to their point of 
 
113 The author first envisioned the idea of using linear programming to optimize the utility of 
pre-deployment training during the SO4410 “Models of Conflict” course at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  Constant collaboration with the Operations Research Department and the TRADOC 
Analysis Center (TRAC) Monterey at the Naval Postgraduate School mitigated the author’s not 
having the necessary higher math skills and allowed development of the working model and the 
subsequent Decision Support Tool.  Specifically, CPT Ricky Brown and Mr. Jack Jackson from 
TRAC Monterey, and Prof. Matthew Carlyle from the OR Department, used the author’s vision to 
formulate and design the math program to operationalize the model,  All coding and program 
writing was done by these three gentlemen.  
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proficiency.  If any available time remains, the program then sorts the tasks again 
by Priority, with Frequency being a second index, and allocates all remaining 
time in the increment chosen by the user.     
C. OPERATIONALIZING THE MODEL  
The first step in using the model is the user selecting which tasks to train.  
These decisions could come after dialogue with the unit commander, research of 
trends in the operational area, and communication with the deployed unit in the 
Leader’s unit’s battlespace.  Not all tasks in the contemporary operating 
environment are relevant to the operating environment.  For example, very few 
units train Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, high-yield Explosives 
(CBRNE) before deploying.  These choices determine the decision variables for 
the model. 
The second step is the user assigning a priority of one to five for each task 
based upon the commander’s intent.  This gives each task a ranking relative to 
the others and is purely subjective to indicate where the task falls in the 
commander’s vision. 
The third step is the user assigning a factor reflecting the historical 
frequency of the task being used in the operational area.  This data comes from 
study of SIGACT reports, trends, and communication with the deployed unit.  
Using accurate figures reflecting how often Soldiers performed a task over a 
designated period of time is the best approximation of the probability that the task 
may be performed during a future event.  This factor is by far the most imprecise 
because there is no guarantee that just because an event occurred previously 
that it will occur again.  However, using this data allows the user to identify trends 
and further rank tasks according to the probability with which they will likely occur 
again.   
The product of the priority that indicates commander’s intent and the 
historical frequency reflecting probability becomes the coefficient for each task 
that determines the profit it will produce for the optimization.  The user is able to 
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ensure that the results of the model—while objective from the standpoint of math 
and probability—are accurate and specific for his/her unit by assigning subjective 













WEIGHT Time req Time req Excess Increments
STEP 1: SELECT WHICH TASKS THE UNIT EXPECTS TO PERFORM IN THE AOR 1.5 3.783333333 10.5 5
Select Task List Priority Frequency Begin Learning Proficient Allocation
 AIR‐GROUND INTEGRATION (AGI) ‐‐> EMPLOY ATTACK AVIATION 2 0.5 2.333333333 6 11
 ASSESS AND RESPOND TO THREATS (ESCALATION OF FORCE) 5 0.5 1.016666667 2.5714286 12.07142857
 COMPLETE BASIC LANGUAGE / CULTURE TRAINING 3 0.5 0.433333333 1.9285714 6.928571429
COMPLETE BIOMETRICS TRAINING 5 0.5 0.85 1.9285714
COMPLETE COMBAT LIFESAVING SKILLS BY COMPLETING BASIC FIRST AID TASKS 5 0.5 2.5 3.8571429
PERFORM FIRST AID FOR A BLEEDING AND/OR SEVERED EXTREMITY 2 0.5 2.833333333 11.285714
PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN ABDOMINAL WOUND 1 0.5 1.1 2.6666667
PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN CHEST WOUND 3 0.5 1.566666667 8.8571429
PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN HEAD WOUND 3 0.5 0.533333333 1.7142857
PERFORM FIRST AID FOR BURNS 3 0.5 0.85 1.7142857
PERFORM FIRST AID FOR HEAT INJURIES 3 0.5 0.458333333 1.25
PERFORM FIRST AID TO CLEAR AN OBJECT STUCK IN THE THROAT OF A CONSCIOUS CASUALTY 3 0.5 0.75 1.5714286
PERFORM FIRST AID TO PREVENT OR CONTROL SHOCK 3 0.5 0.958333333 1.5714286
PERFORM FIRST AID TO RESTORE BREATHING AND/OR PULSE 3 0.5 0.833333333 1.5714286
COMPLETE HOT AND COLD WEATHER INJURY TRAINING 3 0.5 0.708333333 1.4285714  
Figure 13. DECISION SUPPORT TOOL
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To calculate how many training hours are available—the resource of 
time—the user inputs the expected end date of the training period (the model 
automatically assigns the current date as the start date).  The Leader can refine 
the time available by indicating how many hours out of each day the unit will 
train, and by indicating any non-training days such as weekends, holidays, leave 
periods, etc.114  
The user has numerous options to personalize the behavior of the model.  
Modifying the provided learning curves affects how much and in what order a 
task receives time.  The profiles for these curves came from a random sampling 
of Leaders to provide constraints within which the model can begin optimization.  
The user may decide that his/her unit is at a different state of training on some 
tasks.  For example, a seasoned unit may require less time to reach the point of 
diminishing returns for some tasks, and by changing this value on those tasks to 
reflect his/her unit’s proficiency, the user will force the model to allocate that time 
elsewhere.115  To cause the model to more closely follow the Commander’s 
intent rather than the frequency events occur, the user can weight the priority.  
Lastly, the user can specify the increments in which the model allocates excess 
time to each task beyond proficiency to ensure more balanced extra training.  
The dilemma that the model assists with is the decision to allocate time to 
high priority/low frequency versus low priority/high frequency tasks.  Reacting to 
an IED strike may not occur that often (low frequency), but when it does, Soldiers 
must have complete proficiency in all individual skills related to this high priority 
event.  On the other hand, an event such as navigating dismounted could have  a 
lower priority in the Commander’s estimate, but it may occur daily.  Soldiers must  
 
 
114 Prof. Matthew Boensel from the Systems Engineering Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School design and developed the Excel user interface.  Prof. Boensel received the 
author’s concept and initial draft and wrote the code to produce a working program to act as the 
user interface for the Decision Support Tool. 
115 See Apendix C, “Learing Curve Data.” 
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be just as proficient in recurring tasks as they must be in infrequent, yet high 
priority tasks.  How does the Leader balance training between high priority/low 
frequency and low priority/high frequency tasks? 
D. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION/EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Trials of the Decision Support Tool confirm that subjective influences will 
affect training plans.  To simplify the experiments, the author selected a reduced 
number of tasks.  In one experiment, the author assigned certain tasks higher 
priorities than others, but kept the frequency of each task equal.  The Decision 
Support Tool first allocated time to all tasks so that each received the minimum 
required time.  On subsequent loops, the tool assigned remaining time to the 
higher priority tasks first before exhausting available time.   
These results indicate that the tool is able to allocate time consistent with 
the Commander’s preferences.  The results also confirm that Commanders’ 













WEIGHT Time req Time req Excess Increments
STEP 1: SELECT WHICH TASKS THE UNIT EXPECTS TO PERFORM IN THE AOR 1 16.18333333 46.916667 5
Select Task List Priority Frequency Begin Learning Proficient Allocation
 AIR‐GROUND INTEGRATION (AGI) ‐‐> EMPLOY ATTACK AVIATION 5 0.5 2.333333333 6 16
 ASSESS AND RESPOND TO THREATS (ESCALATION OF FORCE) 5 0.5 1.016666667 2.5714286 12.57142857
 COMPLETE BASIC LANGUAGE / CULTURE TRAINING 5 0.5 0.433333333 1.9285714 11.92857143
 COMPLETE BIOMETRICS TRAINING 5 0.5 0.85 1.9285714 11.92857143
 COMPLETE COMBAT LIFESAVING SKILLS BY COMPLETING BASIC FIRST AID TASKS 4 0.5 2.5 3.8571429 13.85714286
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR A BLEEDING AND/OR SEVERED EXTREMITY 4 0.5 2.833333333 11.285714 21.28571429
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN ABDOMINAL WOUND 4 0.5 1.1 2.6666667 9.75
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN CHEST WOUND 3 0.5 1.566666667 8.8571429 13.85714286
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN HEAD WOUND 3 0.5 0.533333333 1.7142857 6.714285714
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR BURNS 3 0.5 0.85 1.7142857 6.714285714
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR HEAT INJURIES 2 0.5 0.458333333 1.25 6.25
 PERFORM FIRST AID TO CLEAR AN OBJECT STUCK IN THE THROAT OF A CONSCIOUS CASUALTY 2 0.5 0.75 1.5714286 6.571428571
 PERFORM FIRST AID TO PREVENT OR CONTROL SHOCK 1 0.5 0.958333333 1.5714286 6.571428571  
Figure 14. RESULTS OF COMMANDER’S BIAS
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In a second experiment, all tasks received the same priority, but some had 
higher frequencies than others.  As predicted, the Tool assigned greater amounts 
of the time remaining to the tasks with higher frequencies first.  These results 













WEIGHT Time req Time req Excess Increments
STEP 1: SELECT WHICH TASKS THE UNIT EXPECTS TO PERFORM IN THE AOR 1 16.18333333 46.916667 5
Select Task List Priority Frequency Begin Learning Proficient Allocation
 AIR‐GROUND INTEGRATION (AGI) ‐‐> EMPLOY ATTACK AVIATION 5 0.1 2.333333333 6 11
 ASSESS AND RESPOND TO THREATS (ESCALATION OF FORCE) 5 0.2 1.016666667 2.5714286 7.571428571
 COMPLETE BASIC LANGUAGE / CULTURE TRAINING 5 0.3 0.433333333 1.9285714 6.928571429
 COMPLETE BIOMETRICS TRAINING 5 0.4 0.85 1.9285714 6.928571429
 COMPLETE COMBAT LIFESAVING SKILLS BY COMPLETING BASIC FIRST AID TASKS 5 0.5 2.5 3.8571429 8.857142857
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR A BLEEDING AND/OR SEVERED EXTREMITY 5 0.6 2.833333333 11.285714 16.28571429
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN ABDOMINAL WOUND 5 0.7 1.1 2.6666667 9.75
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN CHEST WOUND 5 0.8 1.566666667 8.8571429 18.85714286
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN HEAD WOUND 5 0.9 0.533333333 1.7142857 11.71428571
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR BURNS 5 1.5 0.85 1.7142857 11.71428571
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR HEAT INJURIES 5 2.5 0.458333333 1.25 11.25
 PERFORM FIRST AID TO CLEAR AN OBJECT STUCK IN THE THROAT OF A CONSCIOUS CASUALTY 5 3.5 0.75 1.5714286 11.57142857
 PERFORM FIRST AID TO PREVENT OR CONTROL SHOCK 5 4 0.958333333 1.5714286 11.57142857  
Figure 15. RESULTS OF FREQUENCY
 91
 92
A third experiment with mixed priorities and frequencies produced varied 
time allocations consistent with the experimental inputs that most likely would not 













WEIGHT Time req Time req Excess Increments
STEP 1: SELECT WHICH TASKS THE UNIT EXPECTS TO PERFORM IN THE AOR 1 16.18333333 46.916667 5
Select Task List Priority Frequency Begin Learning Proficient Allocation
 AIR‐GROUND INTEGRATION (AGI) ‐‐> EMPLOY ATTACK AVIATION 5 0.1 2.333333333 6 16
 ASSESS AND RESPOND TO THREATS (ESCALATION OF FORCE) 4 0.2 1.016666667 2.5714286 12.57142857
 COMPLETE BASIC LANGUAGE / CULTURE TRAINING 3 0.3 0.433333333 1.9285714 6.928571429
 COMPLETE BIOMETRICS TRAINING 2 0.4 0.85 1.9285714 6.928571429
 COMPLETE COMBAT LIFESAVING SKILLS BY COMPLETING BASIC FIRST AID TASKS 1 0.5 2.5 3.8571429 8.857142857
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR A BLEEDING AND/OR SEVERED EXTREMITY 2 0.6 2.833333333 11.285714 16.28571429
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN ABDOMINAL WOUND 3 0.7 1.1 2.6666667 9.75
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN CHEST WOUND 4 0.8 1.566666667 8.8571429 18.85714286
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN HEAD WOUND 5 0.9 0.533333333 1.7142857 11.71428571
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR BURNS 4 1.5 0.85 1.7142857 11.71428571
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR HEAT INJURIES 3 2.5 0.458333333 1.25 11.25
 PERFORM FIRST AID TO CLEAR AN OBJECT STUCK IN THE THROAT OF A CONSCIOUS CASUALTY 2 3.5 0.75 1.5714286 6.571428571
 PERFORM FIRST AID TO PREVENT OR CONTROL SHOCK 1 4 0.958333333 1.5714286 6.571428571  
Figure 16. RESULTS OF MIXED BIAS AND FREQUENCY
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For a fourth experiment with less than the required time available, the tool 
returned allocations of the limited time consistent with the experimental priorities 
and conditions in the theoretical operating environment.  Allocations colored 
green received enough time to reach proficiency.  Red allocations received just 
enough time to start learning a task.  Yellow allocations received more than the 
minimum, but less than the time required for proficiency.  This demonstrates that 
the tool could assist Leaders in making difficult training decisions when the time 













WEIGHT Time req Time req Excess Increments
STEP 1: SELECT WHICH TASKS THE UNIT EXPECTS TO PERFORM IN THE AOR 1 16.18333333 46.916667 5
Select Task List Priority Frequency Begin Learning Proficient Allocation
 AIR‐GROUND INTEGRATION (AGI) ‐‐> EMPLOY ATTACK AVIATION 5 0.1 2.333333333 6 2.333333333
 ASSESS AND RESPOND TO THREATS (ESCALATION OF FORCE) 5 0.2 1.016666667 2.5714286 1.016666667
 COMPLETE BASIC LANGUAGE / CULTURE TRAINING 5 0.3 0.433333333 1.9285714 0.433333333
 COMPLETE BIOMETRICS TRAINING 5 0.4 0.85 1.9285714 0.85
 COMPLETE COMBAT LIFESAVING SKILLS BY COMPLETING BASIC FIRST AID TASKS 4 0.5 2.5 3.8571429 2.5
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR A BLEEDING AND/OR SEVERED EXTREMITY 4 0.6 2.833333333 11.285714 9.521428571
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN ABDOMINAL WOUND 4 0.7 1.1 2.6666667 2.666666667
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN CHEST WOUND 3 0.8 1.566666667 8.8571429 8.857142857
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR AN OPEN HEAD WOUND 3 0.9 0.533333333 1.7142857 1.714285714
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR BURNS 3 1 0.85 1.7142857 1.714285714
 PERFORM FIRST AID FOR HEAT INJURIES 2 1.5 0.458333333 1.25 1.25
 PERFORM FIRST AID TO CLEAR AN OBJECT STUCK IN THE THROAT OF A CONSCIOUS CASUALTY 2 2 0.75 1.5714286 1.571428571
 PERFORM FIRST AID TO PREVENT OR CONTROL SHOCK 1 3 0.958333333 1.5714286 1.571428571  




All of these experiments validate the hypotheses in this thesis, and the 
Decision Support Tool’s ability to predict results consistent with the hypotheses.  
In addition, the tool is able to return objective outputs in keeping with the 
subjective inputs of the Leader using the tool.  The odds of a future leader 
adhering to the exact time allocations provided by the tool are practically zero.  
Nevertheless, the utility of the tool is that it cuts through all the random influences 
that would cause a Leader to question how and where to allocate time.  Instead 
of randomly scheduling training, the Leader will have a guide with which to plan 
training that strictly adheres to trends and priorities. 
According to the sample values obtained for the learning curves of time 
required to reach minimum and maximum proficiency, a Soldier needs 75.685 
hours and 271.8 hours, respectively.  A rudimentary calculation of Soldiers 
training 12 hours per day (six hours of sleep and three hours for meals) reveals 
that it is possible to train every DMETL task to proficiency in only 22.65 days.  
This rough calculation assumes that Soldiers train constantly for all 12 hours per 
day.  With most units having anywhere from six months to a year to prepare for 
deployment, there appears to be no problem finding the necessary time to train.  
However, when one factors in weekends, holidays, events external to the unit, 
AARs, movement to and from training areas, etc., real useable training time is 
actually much less.   
During the research of this thesis, two of the surveyed brigade combat 
teams had received change of mission orders late in their training cycles forcing 
them to conduct mission analysis and retrain for a different theater.  One brigade 
combat team received its change of mission during its mission rehearsal 
exercise, which typically occurs approximately 60 days from deployment.  The 
Decision Support Tool could assist a unit in a similar situation in retooling training 
when its operational area or environment changes.   
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The Decision Support Tool is helpful for tailoring training to make it 
relevant.  If a Leader were to make the effort to seek inputs from a deployed unit 
by studying SIGACT logs and storyboards and find out what skills were most 
mission essential, and integrate the Commander’s intent, it may be possible to 
design training at homestation that will most replicate the operational 
environment.  This would assist the Leader in closing the gap between the 
deploying unit’s preparedness and the deployed unit’s experience.   
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VI. FINDINGS 
The goal in training is achieving mastery, not just proficiency.116 
    
    -FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations 
 
 The intent of this thesis was to determine if it were possible to develop a 
systematic method for conducting better pre-deployment training.  The first step 
was to consult the literature and see if there are any accepted solutions for 
planning realistic and relevant training for deploying units.  Due to a lack of 
published information, use of surveys first verified influences in the contemporary 
operating environment and then determine their effects.  The second purpose of 
the surveys was to determine if some influences resulted in better training than 
others.  The last step of the research was to develop a math model to simulate 
the effects of influences in order to confirm the hypotheses relating to influences 
in the contemporary operating environment.  The math model proved effective at 
simulating the effects of influences on training; it is therefore applicable as a tool 
for inputting various real world influences to develop objective training plans. 
This thesis reveals four major findings and recommendations. 
 
 ARFORGEN CAN HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON PRE-
DEPLOYMENT TRAINING 
Numerous Leaders interviewed for this thesis expressed frustration with 
ARFORGEN’s impacts on training.  Although the intent of ARFORGEN is to reset 
units with the necessary personnel, equipment, and training to prepare them for 
their next deployment, its processes often impede effective training.   
 
 
116 U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, FM 7-0 (Training for Full Spectrum Operations), 2–8. 
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With respect to personnel, numerous Leaders and staff officers 
commented on the effects staff changeover had on unit training.  One brigade 
commander specifically commented that HRC needs to fix its model for 
personnel fill.117  At the unit-level, one 1SG commented, “It is impossible to train 
when you do not have all of your pax.  You start individual training without the 
individuals present, so you end up spending the year re-training the same tasks, 
time provided, once people come in.”118  The effects of personnel turbulence at 
all levels is obvious: it affects training at echelons above and below.  The most 
telling of comments relating to personnel turbulence is that from an E5 engineer:  
I came to the unit before deployment.  I didn’t get a lot of the 
training the rest of the company got. … I honestly feel that if it 
wasn’t for the training I received with the Guard in 2005 I wouldn’t 
have been ready for combat with this unit in 2008. … I got no 
training from my unit but I did execute a lot of tasks down range.119 
The most outspoken during surveys were logistics units speaking about 
their equipping and resourcing for training.  Closely behind this were units in 
general talking about having enough time to train on equipment with which they 
would deploy.  One E7 truck driver said that,  
Support Soldiers in BCTs (primarily in FSCs) are becoming more 
like maneuver forces yet training and equipment allocations are not 
sufficient in comparison to that of traditional infantry maneuver 
platoons.120   
The author received comments similar to these during every meeting with 
logistics units in the four BCTs surveyed for this thesis.  Maneuver units 
commented that they wished they had received new equipment at least prior to 
their unit mission rehearsal exercises so they could integrate it in operations.  An 
 
117 Anonymous quote from personal interview during surveys. 
118 Anonymous quote to author collected during surveys. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Anonymous quote to author collected during surveys. 
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E6 engineer commented, “Without the equipment we cannot effectively use it 
once we hit boots on the ground overseas.  Instead we spend two weeks to one 
month training Soldiers once there and miss out on critical time to do COIN 
operations.”121    
To remedy the effects ARFORGEN has on personnel—which affects 
training for units, one brigade operations officer went so far as to schedule the 
same mobile training teams twice: once at the mid-point of his brigade’s trainup, 
and once at the end after their mission rehearsal exercise.  He said that he knew 
a lot of the Soldiers needing this training would not be available or assigned 
during the initial period of training, so he decided to reinforce this training again 
months later when he was confident that his brigade has received its personnel 
fill. 122 
For ARFORGEN to have its intended effects on Army preparedness, units 
must have a majority of their personnel fills and new equipment prior to starting 
their training. 
 
 AFGHANISTAN REQUIRES UNIQUELY TAILORED TRAINING 
The literature suggested that units must train differently for 
counterinsurgency because a diverse approach is necessary.  COIN requires a 
blend of both traditional warfighting skills for kinetic operations, and also non-
traditional skills such as partnering, population engagement, cultural sensitivity, 
and language proficiency for non-kinetic operations.  Regrettably, the literature 
provides ample discussion and guidance on what training is necessary for non-
kinetic operations to the exclusion of individual Soldier skills.  It is dangerous to 
overlook these, because even though COIN is not major combat operations, 
once the insurgents engage U.S. forces, the differences disappear.  With the 
high operational tempo for units deploying to Afghanistan, coupled with the 
 
121 Anonymous quote to author collected during surveys. 
122 Personal communication to author during interview. 
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necessity to train for myriad missions across the spectrum of conflict, training 
basic individual skills—while seeming straightforward in comparison—receives 
less focus.  Regarding training basic skills, one 1SG commented, “New soldiers 
require the basics prior to executing more complex tasks.   … core proficiencies 
trained to a high level build flexibility to accomplish the many varied tasks that 
may be assigned in theater.”123  Unfortunately, the consequences of not having 
proper training in the right individual skills can be far more catastrophic than the 
consequences of botching a key leader engagement.   
While the literature did not identify a method for better task selection, the 
collection of AARs and monographs did offer a wealth of suggestions for what 
skills are mission essential.  Numerous leaders at the company level related what 
skills they found were most useful for their Soldiers, and what they would train 
differently if they were to advise other commanders who were deploying.  The 
most recurring recommendations from Leaders included: physical conditioning, 
Soldiers cross-training on all weapons and crew tasks, long range 
marksmanship, proficiency with all communications systems, and combat 
support units training like maneuver units.  Nonetheless, the suggestions were 
the results of empirical experience.  Is there a method to get it closer to “Right” 
before deploying?  
To ensure focused and relevant training, deploying Leaders should take 
every opportunity to research written material on the CALL Web site and other 
forums, and establish early communication with the units they are replacing.  




123 Anonymous quote to author collected during surveys. 
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 RESOURCES, INSTEAD OF OPERATIONAL TRENDS AND 
DIALOGUE WITH DEPLOYED UNITS, DRIVE TRAINING 
Because the literature only obliquely addressed individual skills but did not 
discuss factors that can and should affect training, research included surveys of 
units to ascertain what caused Leaders to choose and exclude tasks from 
training.  The surveys revealed that certain factors did influence Leaders’ 
decisions when planning training and the subjects confirmed that in some cases 
one or two influences affected their decisions far more than the rest.  The results 
confirmed the experimental hypotheses. 
The results of the surveys initially did not reveal anything unexpected.  
Time and available resources were the predominant reasons why certain tasks 
were not trained.  Units simply did not have the ability to train some things.  
Leaders chose to include tasks primarily because of biases: the Commander’s 
intent and the Leaders’ previous deployment experiences.  Units subsequently 
adjusted their priorities and allocation of effort during training for the same 
reasons they excluded tasks: Time and Resources.  Post deployment, a majority 
of Soldiers indicated that their training was very effective.  However, there was 
not significant skew in the responses.  In other words, Soldiers’ responses rating 
their training from Ineffective to Very Effective covered the entire range, although 
a majority did answer Very Effective.    
That Time and Resources were the primary reasons Leaders excluded 
tasks and also subsequently modified their effort indicates that ARFORGEN is 
not completely synchronized with units in the Train phase.  The survey results 
indicate that some decisions by Leaders are forced choices.  Resources have 
always driven training, contrary to how the process is supposed to work.  
However, if resources curtail training to the point that necessary training is 
affected, then Soldiers may have issues later while deployed.  Commander’s 
intent and the Leader’s experience produced the greatest biases in why units 
chose to train certain tasks.  The Commander ultimately decides what the unit 
trains, so this is not a detractor from expected results.  However, if a subordinate 
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leader were to train only what the Commander wanted, and the Commander had 
not defined the problem statement for the operational area correctly, then all 
training would be skewed to represent his/her biases.  Similarly, if training plans 
were simply the manifestation of a Leader’s past experience, and the plans were 
not continually refined as the operational environment evolved, then training 
would cease to be relevant and realistic.     
Among the brigade and battalion operations officers interviewed for this 
thesis, there was not a consensus on how much deploying Leaders should “go 
their own way” versus incorporate lessons learned from deployed units.  Methods 
of operation excessively focused on the former could reinforce the paradigm of 
relearning old lessons the hard way instead of picking up where the previous unit 
left off.  On the other hand, too much reliance on the latter methods, when not 
refreshed with constant analysis and refinement, leads to stale ideas that are not 
dynamic to match dynamic situations. 
The same recommendations for the previous finding apply here.  By 
conducting thorough research and establishing communications with deployed 
units, Leaders and staffs will be able to identify what training is essential, and 
therefore warrants spending of limited resources.  Being armed with the right 
documentation can help to justify requests to a higher headquarters. 
 
 SOLDIERS GENERALLY PERCEIVE THEIR TRAINING AS 
EFFECTIVE, ALTHOUGH, ACCORDING TO MATHEMATICAL 
RESULTS, IT IS THE LEADER’S DECISION REGARDING WHAT TO 
EXCLUDE TO PRODUCE THE MOST EFFECTIVE TRAINING 
Interestingly, skew analysis and comparison of Leaders’ choices with 
subordinates’ rating of their training indicated that decisions to not include certain 
tasks had the greatest impact on effective training.  Multiple conclusions can be 
drawn from this.  One of which is that by excluding some tasks, Leaders were 
able to devote that time to other more important tasks.  Another possible 
conclusion is that Leaders were able to guess which tasks would not be mission 
essential, and Soldiers therefore perceived their training as more effective and 
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focused.  An important caveat to this finding is that only one post-deployment 
subordinate population was available for surveying, and this population was not 
from the same unit as the Leaders whose choices were compared against.  By 
summing all of the Leaders’ responses in this research, the assumption was 
made that their answers were representative of most Leaders. 
Due to a limited sample size of units available for research, multiple 
parallel studies of Leaders’ decisions made during pre-deployment training and 
post-deployment questioning of Soldiers to gauge the effectiveness of their 
Leaders’ task selection processes was not possible.  A suggestion for a future 
researcher with at least two years’ time would be to track multiple units all the 
way through the ARFORGEN process: from the planning of pre-deployment 
training, through training, and after redeployment.  Studies of numerous units 
would further refine and identify the thought processes of Leaders and assist in 
confirming if there are any universal patterns.  Correlating these patterns with 
their subordinates’ rating of their training would help to determine what processes 
are more effective than others.   
Leaders need to make decisions to prioritize tasks after careful analysis of 
the operating environment.  The Decision Support Tool developed in this thesis 
has the ability to assist Leaders in identifying the correct training tasks and 
allocating proper time.  It uses optimization to allocate time to training selected 
tasks in a manner to produce the greatest utility concurrent with the Leader’s 
priorities and the frequency of task use.  After selection, each task received a 
priority of one to five, and a frequency from the number of occurrences divided by 
the time of observation.  This frequency is a valid descriptor of trends and is the 
closest possible approximation to historical probability available to predict future 
trends.  The model was initially effective in confirming the causal arguments 
introduced in Chapter II.  By inputting experimental values for commander’s 
preferences and frequencies, the model’s output produced training plans that 
represented the subjective inputs.  Having validated the hypotheses and 
producing outputs consistent with the user’s inputs, the model has shown itself to 
 106
be a valid Decision Support Tool for future use by Leaders seeking 
mathematically correct objective results for their subjective inputs.   
Future refinements of the Decision Support Tool could include linking it to 
some database that constantly updates the tasks list with the regularly occurring 
FRAGO listing required mission essential tasks.  A tool that updates itself 
automatically with the tasks and Web links to online resources associated with 
the tasks would assist in providing the Leader with options for training.  Another 
refinement to the tool that would assist in decisionmaking is being able to more 
dynamically model the tradeoff between high priority/low frequency and low 
priority/high frequency tasks.  Just as a Commander’s intent cannot always trump 
the environmental conditions, the conditions cannot rule out the Commander’s 
desired endstate.  Being able to incorporate these factors into the model would 
aid in allowing the Leader to fine tune training. 
Research for this thesis did not reveal that there are systemic 
shortcomings in Army Leaders’ methods or techniques for pre-deployment 
training.  The goal of this thesis was not to find fault with units’ training.  The 
intent was to verify that certain factors influenced training and determine the 
effects of those influences on training.  Once the results of those effects were 
found, a methodology for planning better training was introduced.   
The author, however, was unable to find any published Army manuals or 
literature referencing best practices for planning pre-deployment training from 
former commanders.  While there was a large quantity of published AARs and 
monographs on the CALL Web site discussing what units subsequently learned, 
there were only scant references in other documents describing possible 
methodologies for deploying Leaders.  The Army could capture best practices 
and publish a set of principles, not guidelines.  Guidelines could become too 
parochial, and stifle innovation.  
The aim of this thesis is not to question why the Army has not provided a 
checklist of what to do for deploying Leaders.  A Leader’s job is to constantly 
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assess the situation and adjust priorities accordingly.  Providing a rote checklist 
would stifle initiative and discourage Leaders from being innovative and creative.  
The tool is nothing more than an application to stimulate analysis and aid in 
decision-making.  If Leaders were to use this Decision Support Tool, or any 
published checklist for that matter as the sole method for planning pre-
deployment training, they would become reliant upon the deployed units for all 
the answers.  The outgoing unit is and should be an excellent source of 
information.  However, the operating environment is dynamic, and what worked 
in one situation may not always work in the next.  Each Leader is responsible for 
doing his/her own analysis, and that is the intent of this tool. 
 Army Leaders have the awesome responsibility to prepare their Soldiers 
to deploy, fight, win, and come home.  Focusing on graduate-level 
counterinsurgency, should not be to the exclusion of training basic Soldiers skills; 
for it is those individual skills that enable Soldiers to perform the more complex 
missions.  Reducing the proficiency gap between preparation and deployment—
the First Hundred Days, is the first step in making Soldiers more initially mission 
proficient.  It is possible to provide Soldiers arriving to an operational area with 
close to the same proficiency in skills as those Soldiers who are completing their 
tour.  The First Hundred Days would be far shorter, and during this time, Soldiers 
would be able to focus on learning the specifics of their environment, instead of 
learning skills with which they should have initially deployed.  The enemy will 
have much less of a window to exploit, U.S. allies and partners will have more 
confidence in the mission, and Soldiers will be more effective and survivable.    
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APPENDIX A PRE-DEPLOYMENT SURVEY 
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COMPLETE COUNTER INSURGENCY TRAINING (COIN) 0.541666667 1.5714286  
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